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INTRODUCTION
Liberals and communitarians have been holding a lively debate
in political theory circles over the last few years.' Communitarians
are critical of the priority that liberals give to individual rights;
although communitarians do not deny that rights are important,2 they
do question whether a society should emphasize individual rights over
t Associate Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. BA, Tufts University,
1986;J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1990; LL.M., Cambridge University, 1995. I
am very thankful to Jan Broekman, Don Dripps, Linda McClain, Richard Storrow, and
Juliet Wheeler for their extensive comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I would also
like to thank the participants in the University of Illinois College of Law's faculty workshop
series. I am indebted to Norman Farnam for his excellent research assistance. The David
B. Baum scholarship fund provided research support.
1 See, e.g., CoMNuiNuTARiIsM: ANEWPuBLIc ETmIcs (Markate Daly ed., 1994); DEMO-
cRA-C Coss iuNrIr (NoMos XXXV) (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993); LIBER-
AusM AND ITs CRamcs (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984); STEPHEN MuLHALL & ADAM SWiFr,
LIBERALS & CoMmsNrrARiANs (2d ed. 1996); NEw CommtumTAAN TmiuNG (Amitai Et-
zioni ed., 1995); THE COmLmuNrrARLN CHALLENGE TO LIBERALISM (Ellen Frankel Paul et al.
eds., 1996); THE IUBERALisM-COMMUNrrAmANISM DEBATE (C.F. Delaney ed., 1994).
2 See Philip Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 445, 454
(1987) ("A communitarian morality is not rights-centered, but it is not opposed to rights or
indifferent to them or casual about them.").
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communal norms and responsibilities when confronting difficult
questions of political morality and justice.A Communitarians believe
that the liberal focus on rights leads to the separation and displace-
ment of individuals from the communities to which they belong. Ac-
cording to communitarians, rights are not preexisting, universal
principles that are logically prior to community; instead, rights are
internal to the shared traditions and understandings of particular
societies.4
Communitarians also question the liberal conception of state
neutrality that seeks to separate the right from the good. State neu-
trality regarding different, and often conflicting, conceptions of what
constitutes a "good life" is important to liberals because it allows indi-
viduals to choose the lives that they think are best for them. A state
that is neutral as to ends does not impose its version of the good on its
citizens.5 An impartial state also acts as a neutral arbiter in resolving
disputes among citizens. Thus, liberals demand that the state separate
issues of morality from political debates and definitions of rights.6 In
other words, we must define rights prior to, and independently of, the
good.
Communitarians believe that the separation between the right
and the good is largely illusory.7 The state constantly chooses among
3 See AMrrA ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND MoRALrY IN A DEMO-
cRATIC SocETry 41-44 (1996); infra Part 11A (discussing the work of Michael Sandel).
4 See infra Part I11A (discussing the work of Michael Walzer); see also MARY ANN GLEN-
DON, RIGHTS TALK THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 137-38 (1991) ("The
myriad associations that generate social norms are the invisible supports of, and the sine
qua non for, a regime in which individuals have rights."); 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHI-
CAL PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 206 (1985) (arguing, in rejecting the
primacy of individual rights, "that the free individual of the West is only what he is by virtue
of the whole society and civilization which brought him to be and which nourishes him");
Christopher J. Berry, Shared Understanding and the Democratic Way of Life, in DEMOCRATIC
COMMUNITY, supra note 1, at 67, 73 ("[T]o communitarians [a] recourse to rights [as
trumps] rests on a false prioritisation. The idea of individuals as ipso facto possessors of
rights only makes sense in terms of some supposed extra-communal circumstance, a Lock-
ean State of Nature for example, within which 'rights' enjoy some special status.").
5 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIALJUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 359-78 (1980);JoHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 192-94 (1993); see also Allen E. Buchanan, Assessing the Com-
munitarian Critique of Liberalism, 99 ETHICS 852, 854 (1989) ("[I]f the state enforces the
basic civil and political rights it will leave individuals free, within broad limits, to pursue
their own conceptions of the good and will preclude itself from imposing upon them any
one particular conception of the good or of virtue."). Ronald Dworkin has retreated from
his former position that a strict neutrality among different conceptions of the good must
be at the core of liberalism. See RONALD Dwo, In, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 205-13 (1985).
6 See RAwLS, supra note 5, at 213-54.
7 See, e.g., Alasdar MacIntyre, The Privatization of Good: An Inaugural Lecture in THE
LIBERALISM-COMMUNrrARtANiSM DEBATE, supra note 1, at 1, 1. Maclntyre cites Thomas Aqui-
nas and Aristotle for the proposition that
we can only understand the right in the light afforded by the good. The
good for the members of each species is that end to which, qua members of
that species, those members move in achieving their specific perfection.
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different priorities depending on what is good for its citizens; even the
judicial branch often makes difficult constitutional decisions by en-
gaging in arguments and assessments about morality and human val-
ues.8 Communitarians argue that liberalism's purported neutrality is
problematic because it obscures the fact that even the liberal state
constructs and promotes a particular moral framework, namely, one
that places individual freedom and autonomy at the top of society's
normative hierarchy.9
Communitarians, then, believe that it is entirely proper for the
state to promote particular conceptions of the good. Communitari-
ans ask that the state cultivate certain values, such as civic virtue, self-
respect, and social responsibility, which encourage individuals to par-
ticipate actively in their own communities and self-government. 10 A
truly just and democratic society is created when individuals are active
participants in the many communities to which they belong. This
sense of communal participation and belonging promotes individual
freedom and a true connection with, and responsibility toward,
others."
The rules for right action for rational animals are those rules intentional
conformity to which is required if their specific perfection is to be achieved.
Id.
8 See infra Part IA (discussing the work of Michael Sandel); see also GLENDON, supra
note 4, at 154 ("Nearly all constitutional cases that reach the Supreme Court are hard
cases: they almost always involve choices between positions that are well supported by
weighty moral as well as legal arguments.").
9 See, e.g., Thomas Moody, Some Comparisons Between Liberalism and Eccentric Communi-
tarianism, in THE IBERAUSM-COMMUNrrARIANISM DEBATE, supra note 1, at 91, 96. Moody
argues that
[wie must recognize that liberal neutrality is a myth-any social order will
favor some forms of life over others .... [T]he issue cannot be posed as if
communitarianism were threatening liberty by favoring a form of life while
liberalism had the reassuring virtue of being neutral among them ....
[T]he question [then] becomes: to what extent should a polity favor a form
of life and what form of life should a polity favor?
Id.; see also MichaelJ. Sandel, Introduction, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRmcs, supra note 1, at 1,
1 ("Toleration and freedom and fairness are values too.").
10 See, e.g., Markate Daly, Introduction, in CoMMuNRLAmNmnS: A NEW PUBLIC ETHiCS,
supra note 1, at xvii. Daly argues that "[i]nstead of such values as individual interests,
autonomy, and universality, natural rights, and neutrality, communitarian philosophy is
framed in terms of the common good, social practices and traditions, character, solidarity,
and social responsibility." Id.
11 See Markate Daly, Preface, in CommuNrrAmANsM: A Nmv PuBLic ETHics, supra note
1, at ix. According to Daly, the communitarian conception of human life
gives rise to a distinctive set of concepts and values, and leads to a different
vision of a good society. [Communitarians] believe that in order to dojus-
tice to the importance of social relationships, philosophy must be formu-
lated in such terms as the common good, commitment to particular others,
social practices, shared meanings, and public spiritedness, rather than in
terms of traditional liberalism.
Id.; see also John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro, Introduction, in DEMOCRATIC CoMMUNrIM,
supra note 1, at 1, 2 ("According to the communitarians, unless the virtues and demands of
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Commentators have paid little attention to how the ongoing de-
bate between liberals and communitarians impacts gay rights issues.
In fact, the liberal prism of individual rights largely defines the polit-
ical and legal debates involving gay men and lesbians in the United
States. Whether debating sodomy statutes, employment discrimina-
tion, or same-sex marriage, gay men and lesbians (and their support-
ers) have framed the discussion around the right of privacy, or the right
to be free from discrimination, or the right to marry. Although the gay
rights movement (as its very name suggests) has remained tied to a
discourse of individual rights, other intellectual and political move-
ments on the left side of the American political spectrum have be-
come quite disenchanted with liberalism in general and "rights talk"
in particular. Many feminists, critical legal scholars, and critical race
theorists complain about the inherent limitations of liberalism that
result from its emphasis on what is perceived to be a list of unstable
and indeterminate rights that are largely, it is argued, defined
through the exercise of political power.12 In contrast, gay rights13
scholars and advocates have not expressed that same disenchantment
with liberalism and individual rights.
With the important exception of feminists, most proponents of
gay rights are, from a political theory perspective, liberals. Some
scholars on the "left" side of the gay rights movement promote a poli-
tics of liberation based on individual autonomy and freedom of ex-
pression and sexuality, with few if any public or private restraints. 14
community can gain precedence over individualistic aims and opportunism, at least some
if not most of the time, the social and cultural ingredients of a viable political and eco-
nomic order cannot flourish.").
12 See, e.g., ELizAnxri FOX-GENOVESE, FEMINISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: A CRmQUE OF
INDIVIDUAusM (1991); CAROLE PATEMAN, TiiE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION: A CRT-
CAL ANALYSIS OF LIBERAL THEORY (1979); Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV.
1971 (1990); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984). But see PATRi-
ciAJ. WiLIAms, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 146-65 (1991) (criticizing critical legal
scholars for disregarding political utility of rights).
13 The term gay rights presupposes a liberal paradigm that focuses mostly on the rights
of individuals. In order to mitigate as much as possible the effects of a pre-determined,
liberal theoretical framework, this Article employs the term gay rights not in the narrow
sense of enforceable trumps that thwart majoritarian goals, see RoNAL.D DwoRmN, TAXING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at xv (1977), but in a broader sense, namely as shorthand for important
issues to gay men and lesbians. When I use the term gay rights, I include the interests of
both gay men and lesbians.
14 See, e.g., POLICING PUBLIC SEX: QUEER PoLrTcs AND THE FUTURE OF AIDS ACTIVISM
(Ephen Glenn Colter et al. eds., 1996); Michael Bronski, Behind the Sex Panic! Debate HARV.
GAY & LESBIAN REV., Spring 1998, at 29. The recent debate within the gay community over
whether the government should regulate public establishments where some gay men en-
gage in sexual conduct that can lead to the transmission of HIV illustrates this point. The
sexual liberationists have rejected the criticisms of some gay commentators regarding the
sexual conduct of some gay men as a dangerous effort to repress sexual freedom. See Caleb
Crain, Pleasure Principles: Queer Theorists and Gay Journalists Wrestle Over the Politics of Sex,
LINGUA FRANCA, Oct. 1997, at 27; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Gay Culture Weighs Sense and Sexuality,
[Vol. 85:443
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Others, such as Andrew Sullivan, who are considered to be on the
"right" side of the movement, although not sexual liberationists, are
still liberals because they believe in the primacy of rights and the neu-
trality of the state.15
Of course, feminist political theory offers one possible alternative
to the moral and political ideas that liberalism promotes. In fact,
many scholars have written about the beneficial insights feminist prin-
ciples contribute to the understanding of how society views and regu-
lates gay men and lesbians. 16 Communitarianism, like feminism,
provides an important alternative to liberalism. Surprisingly, the ex-
isting gay rights literature contains little discussion regarding the com-
munitarian critique of liberalism. This Article explores how
communitarianism fares as a theoretical foundation for gay rights
positions.
It is difficult to discuss justice and equality in the United States
without emphasizing individual rights. Any social movement that
seeks to protect and advance the interests of minorities must contend
with the reality that individualism and respect for human autonomy
remain a fundamental part of American ideals regarding justice and
equality.'7 At the same time, however, one must view the freedom
N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 23, 1997, § 4, at 1. The sexual liberationists, some of whom have formed
an advocacy group called "Sex Panic!", have been responding in particular to two recent
books: GABRIEL RoTLLo, SEXUAL ECOLOGY. AIDS AND THE DEsTINY OF GAY MEN (1997);
MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, LIFE OUTSIDE (1997). See Larry Kramer, Gay Culture, Redefined,
N.Y. Tims, Dec. 12, 1997, at A35 (criticizing the views of Sex Panic! supporters and noting
that "[a ]llowing sex-centrism to remain the sole definition of homosexuality is now coming
to be seen as the greatest act of self-destruction").
Many of the sexual liberationists participating in this ongoing debate are academic
proponents of queer theory who would probably object if others labeled them as liberals.
See Cramin, supra, at 28. However, the view held by sexual liberationists that advocates the
protection of individualism and sexual autonomy from coercion and regulation is consis-
tent with the basic tenets of liberalism. As Michael Bronski, one of the queer theorists
behind the group Sex Panicl, has argued, "[t]he profound question raised by the Sex
Panic! debate is how far we are going to allow the conservative impulses in society to con-
trol not only sexual activity and its manifestations, but to determine the very definitions of
acceptable sexuality." Bronski, supra, at 30. Bronski adds that "Et]he important message
here... is the easy link between the anti-Sex Panic! positions and the right-wing attack on
liberal thought." Id.
15 See Andrew Sullivan, Virtually Normal: An Argument About Homosexuality 133-68
(1995).
16 See, e.g., Mary Becker, Strength in Diversity: Feminist Theoretical Approaches to Child Cus-
tody and Same-Sex Relationships, 23 STSON L. REv. 701 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality
and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187; Susan Moller Okin, Sexual Orienta-
tion and Gender Dichotomizing Differences, in SEX, PRFERENCE, AND FAuLY 44 (David M. Es-
fdund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997).
17 See SHANE PHELAN, IDENTrIY POLIcs: LESBIAN FEMINISM AND THE IINTS OF COmfu-
Nm 149 (1989). Phelan suggests that
[e]ven as they challenge liberalism, American social movements draw on
the strength of the liberal appeal to rights and autonomy. Those who ap-
peal to other traditions are often moving, their voices a powerful contrast to
20o00 447
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guaranteed by liberal rights to autonomy in conjunction with the con-
tribution to freedom and dignity that marginalized individuals, such
as gay men and lesbians, receive from the communities to which they
belong. These communities act as buffers between individual homo-
sexuals and the broader, and often hostile, society. Furthermore,
these communities provide gay men and lesbians with the human ties
and bonds that can help them flourish and lead lives of pride and
dignity.18 As this Article seeks to show, the priorities of traditional
liberalism-namely, individualism, autonomy, and the separation of
the moral from the political-do not fully capture the complexity of
the issues of justice that homosexuality raises in our society. Thus,
theoreticians of gay rights must incorporate the value of community
and the role of social encumbrances and attachments into the liberal
theories that have been at the core of gay rights positions for many
years. It is for this reason that an exploration of communitarian ideals
and values from a gay rights perspective is both appropriate and
essential.
This Article does not suggest, however, that communitarianism
replace liberalism as the theoretical foundation for gay rights. As this
Article will demonstrate, communitarianism has its own serious limita-
tions when applied to gay rights issues. Thus, the Article instead seeks
to distinguish the valid from the invalid in the communitarian critique
of liberalism in order to explore how to strengthen liberalism while
making it more relevant to the lives of gay men and lesbians. As
Shane Phelan accurately notes, gay rights scholars "must look, not for
theory that abandons liberalism, but for theory that builds on it, using
the parts we cannot dispense with and working to transform them so
as to foster a freer order than liberalism can, in fact, endorse or
deliver."19
Before addressing communitarianism from a gay rights perspec-
tive, a brief discussion of gay rights from the perspective of the para-
digmatic liberalism of John Rawls serves as a useful background.
Many contemporary communitarians have responded to Rawls's
highly influential ideas.20 While his ideas are well-known and need
not be repeated here, Rawls has recently discussed-for the first
time-how issues of gay rights fit within his conception of political
the degenerate forms of individualism to which American society is increas-
ingly susceptible. And yet they cannot entirely dispense with liberal ideals
without appearing to exercise a moral judgment necessarily suspect.
Id.
18 See infra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
19 PHELAN, supra note 17, at 149. Phelan's discussion refers to lesbians, yet in my
estimation, it also applies to gay men.
20 See MuLHALL & SWIFT, supra note 1, at 1 ("[G] ommunitarian critics... have formu-
lated their positions in terms that make explicit reference to [Rawls's] theory, so that in
many ways Rawls .. . define[s] the agenda.").
[Vol. 85:443
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liberalism.2' Part I of this Article, therefore, evaluates Rawls's assess-
ment of gay rights issues and explains why his ideas offer an incom-
plete vision of how to conduct a debate over gay rights.
The limitations of Rawls's paradigmatic liberalism lead to an as-
sessment of how communitarianism fares as a theoretical foundation
for gay rights positions. Instead of discussing communitarianism in
general, however, this Article evaluates, from a gay fights perspective,
the writings of two leading American communitarian thinkers:
Michael Sandel and Michael Walzer. These two scholars represent dif-
ferent strands in contemporary communitarian thinking: Sandel's
communitarianism is republican in nature while Walzer's model is
egalitarian. 22
Sandel's brand of communitarianism strives toward a particular
normative goal: the promotion of greater civic virtue and participa-
tion by citizens in their own self-government.2 3 According to Sandel,
this civic republican conception of the good should be at the center of
American political philosophy and constitutional jurisprudence. 24
Part II of this Article discusses how the experiences of gay men and
lesbians reflect Sandel's emphasis on the role of community in the
formation of individual identity, and his corresponding critique of the
atomistic individual in liberal political philosophy. Sandel's concep-
tion of community highlights liberalism's failure to pay sufficient at-
tention to the role that communities play in helping marginalized
individuals attain personal freedom.2 5 Sandel, however, calls for the
promotion and strengthening of what he labels "constitutive commu-
nities": those communities into which people are born, such as nation,
family, and church.26 Sandel largely ignores communities formed
21 SeeJohn Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765, 779-80, 788
n.60 (1997).
22 In addition to choosing Sandel and Walzer because they represent different strands
of communitarian thinking, I chose Sandel because he discusses homosexuality to a
greater extent than any other communitarian theorist. See infra note 136 and accompany-
ing text. I chose Walzer because he has developed the most comprehensive theory of
justice of any contemporary American communitarian political thinker. See infra Part IIIA.
While Walzer and Sandel are two of the most prominent contemporary communitar-
ian philosophers, their views by no means represent the totality of Anglo-American com-
munitarian thought. See generally ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER, THE DANcE WIrrH COMMUNrry
(1991) (discussing similarities and differences among different manifestations of commu-
nitarianism including "participatory," "republican," and "religious"). Other contemporary
thinkers whom commentators often label as communitarians include, inter alia, Amitai
Etzioni, Alasdair Macntyre, and Charles Taylor. With the exception of Etzioni, none of
the leading communitarians-including Sandel and Walzer-use that term to describe
themselves. See MuLHALL & SWIFr, supra note 1, at xv.
23 See infra Part II.A.2.
24 See infra Part II.A.
25 See infra notes 142-63 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
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through the voluntary choices of individuals.27 It is these communi-
ties of choice, however, that play the largest role in the formation of
the homosexual identity of gay men and lesbians.28 In addition, these
communities protect gay men and lesbians from some of the oppres-
sion emanating from the larger society.2 9
Furthermore, Sandel's civic republicanism calls for a theory of
constitutional interpretation that is incompatible with this country's
institutional need to protect the autonomy and interests of unpopular
and marginalized minorities.30 Ultimately, Sandel's political philoso-
phy does not sufficiently respect the normative value of autonomy and
free choice; as a result, his theory is ultimately incompatible with the
interests of gay men and lesbians.3'
While Sandel has particular normative ends in mind, Michael
Walzer is more neutral as to ends. Walzer believes that normative
goals regarding that which is just and right are inextricably linked to a
society's shared traditions. For Walzer, the key to justice is what he
calls "complex equality": a form of equality concerned with the distri-
bution of social goods according to criteria that the goods' social
meanings determine. Walzer contends that tyranny and unjust ine-
quality arise when society uses distributive criteria (e.g., money or
faith) to distribute social goods across political, economic, and social
spheres.
Walzer has not applied his theory of justice to gay rights issues.
Part III illustrates how Walzer's emphasis on the social meanings and
roles of institutions and goods can help to explain why the exclusion
of gay men and lesbians from some of those institutions and goods
(e.g., marriage and parenting) is unjust 3 2 One must keep in mind,
however, that applying Walzer's theory of justice to gay rights issues
produces results that are not terribly different from the results
reached through the application of liberal theory. Despite this simi-
larity, the breadth and scope of Walzer's ideas are fascinating: his the-
ory facilitates a full engagement of the normative traditions and values
that are at stake in our society's legal and political deliberations re-
garding homosexuality. Furthermore, Walzer allows for a discourse
on gay rights issues that goes beyond a mere determination of the
appropriate level of state interference in the lives of individuals. In
contrast, liberal theory's separation of the moral from the political
and almost exclusive focus on the dichotomy between the individual
27 See infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
30 See infra Part Il.B.2.
31 See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
32 See infra Part III.B.
[Vol. 85:443
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and the state often fail to account for the broader societal and com-
munal contexts in which discussions of justice and gay rights occur.
Walzer's theory, however, has its own limitations from a gay rights
perspective. Ultimately, resolving contentious issues involving gay
men and lesbians and their relationships solely through the applica-
tion of Walzer's notion of "shared traditions" may not be possible be-
cause, as the debate over same-sex marriage illustrates, a society may
have conflicting internal traditions. For example, an internal societal
analysis of marriage cannot easily reconcile the view that emphasizes
free choice and love as the appropriate distributive criteria (to use
Walzerian terminology) with the view that a person should only
choose a spouse of the opposite gender.33
Furthermore, like most communitarian theories, Walzer's theory
has no antecedent commitment to autonomy. In fact, Walzer rejects
the idea of philosophical norms that are antecedent to other societal
norms 3 4 In the same way that gay men and lesbians should approach
Sandel's ideas cautiously, they should be wary of a theory of political
morality that does not contain the necessary protections against shift-
ing majoritarian norms.35
Thus, the communitarian critique of liberalism is a mixed enter-
prise from a gay rights perspective. While both Sandel and Walzer
make important points about the limitations of liberalism, their re-
spective brands of communitarianism have their own limitations. In
light of the foregoing limitations, Part IV argues that the best theoreti-
cal foundation for gay rights positions is a modified form of liber-
alism, which acknowledges the valid communitarian critiques
proposed by Sandel and Walzer, yet remains committed to traditional
liberal values such as the protection of individual autonomy and
freedom.
I
RAWLSIAN LIBERALISM AND GAY RIGHTS
The liberalism of John Rawls may appear at first glance to be a
well-suited theoretical foundation for gay rights positions, given that it
prioritizes the right over the good within a paradigm of public reason-
ing that separates moral values from political discourse. Gay men and
lesbians may instinctively prefer a theory of justice that brackets out
moral arguments from political discourse, perhaps believing that they
3 See infra Part III.B.1.
34 See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OFJUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQuAUrY 6-
10 (1983).
35 See infra notes 362-66 and accompanying text.
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cannot win those arguments in the face of majoritarian opposition.36
Rawls's vision of public reason and the need for moral bracketing,
however, is ultimately too thin to support a coherent and convincing
argument in favor of gay rights positions.
Rawls defines public reason in a democracy as "the reason of its
citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship. The subject
of their reason is the good of the public: what the political conception
ofjustice requires of society's basic structure of institutions, and of the
purposes and ends they are to serve."37 Rawls's view of public reason
is consistent with his original position heuristic, which posits that citi-
zens who do not know their individual characteristics or their places
in society's economic and social hierarchies would serve as the opti-
mal prototypes for establishing fundamental principles ofjustice.38 As
citizens move from the original position to later stages in the creation
of a well-ordered society, they can gradually lift the veil of ignorance.39
Even when citizens are at the last stage of the process, when they pub-
licly debate particular policy issues within an established constitu-
tional system, Rawls still calls for a separation between political values,
which go to the right, and nonpolitical normative and moral values,
which go to the good. Rawls explains that this separation protects the
political discourse and democratic process, as well as individuals, from
majoritarian definitions of the good.40
Recently, Rawls elaborated on his conception of public reason as
he addressed gay rights issues for the first time.41 Bawls would limit
the public reasoning of government officials, and of citizens in the
process of electing the officials,42 to those political values that under-
lie reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines. 43 These
36 See Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking
Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871, 1872-75 (1997).
37 RAWLS, supra note 5, at 213.
38 SeeJoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTIcE 12 (1971).
39 See id. at 195-99.
40 See RAivs, supra note 5, at 212-54.
41 See Rawls, supra note 21, at 779-80, 788 n.60.
42 See id. at 768-71. While Rawls first notes that the restrictions that his conception of
public reason imposes are applicable to judges, government officials, and candidates for
public office, see id. at 767, the same restrictions ultimately apply to citizens when voting for
their representatives: "[WIe say that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they
were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the
criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact." Id. at 769.
43 See id. at 766-68. There are two caveats to Rawls's limitations on public reasoning.
The first is that the limitations apply to political discourse and not to what he calls "back-
ground culture"-nonpolitical fora such as "churches and associations of all kinds, and
institutions of learning at all levels, especially universities and professional schools, scien-
tific and other societies." Id. at 768 n.13. The second caveat is what he calls "the [public
reasoning] proviso," which permits "reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-
religious, [to] be introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due
course proper political reasons-and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doc-
[Vol. 85:443
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limitations are necessary because citizens with vastly different and
comprehensive moral, philosophical, and religious views can only use
political values44 that are part of an overlapping consensus to justify to
each other the use of political power.45 Public reason allows for the
"exercise of political power... only when we sincerely believe that the
reasons we would offer for our political actions.., are sufficient, and
we also reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably ac-
cept those reasons."46 Citizens, then, abide by the limitations that
public reason imposes, when there is true reciprocity, namely, when
other citizens accept the same limitations, even if this abidance results
in the abandonment of political goals that their comprehensive doc-
trines deem necessary. 47
When Rawls gives examples of how the limitations he imposes on
public reason would operate in practice, he mentions same-sex mar-
riages while discussing "the state's interest in the family and human
life."'48 When a society debates deeply-disputed topics involving the
family, human life, and sexual orientation, Rawls advocates limiting
the debate to the relevant political values that
support and regulate, in an ordered way, the institutions needed to
reproduce political society over time.... This ordered support and
regulation rests on political principles and values, since political so-
ciety is regarded as existing in perpetuity and so as maintaining it-
self and its institutions and culture over generations. Given this
interest, the government would appear to have no interest in the
particular form of family life, or of relations among the sexes, except
insofar as that form or those relations in some way affect the orderly repro-
duction of society over time. Thus, appeals ... against same-sex mar-
riages, as [being] within the government's legitimate interest in the
trines-are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines
introduced are said to support." Id. at 78-84.
44 Rawls cites "[e]xamples of political values [that] include those mentioned in the
preamble to the United States Constitution: a more perfect union, justice, domestic tran-
quility, the common defense, the general welfare, and the blessings of liberty for ourselves
and our posterity." Id. at 776.
45 See id. at 771, 776.
46 Id. at 771.
47 See id. at 770. According to Rawls,
[c]itizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a
system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer
one another fair terms of cooperation according to what they consider the
most reasonable conception of political justice; and when they agree to act
on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular situa-
tions, provided that other citizens also accept those terms.
Id.
48 Id. at 779.
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family, would reflect religious or comprehensive moral doctrines
[and would thus be improper] .49
While Rawls's limitations on public reason seem to favor gay
rights positions, a troubling disparity exists between his theoretical
model and the actual debates over gay rights in our society. The de-
bate regarding same-sex marriage, for example, is at its core about
whether the state should recognize committed same-gender relation-
ships as equal to committed opposite-gender relationships. The fun-
damental disagreement is whether same-gender unions deserve the
same amount of recognition and support as heterosexual unions.50
This dispute opens up a myriad of normative issues including (1) the
instrumental role of marriage in encouraging loyalty and stability in
human relationships, (2) the interrelationship between marriage and
the raising of children, and (3) the unitive and normative value of
marriage for the two individuals involved.51 When Rawls asks parties
on both sides of the debate to limit their public reasoning to the polit-
ical values necessary for the reproduction of society,5 2 he requests that
they confine themselves to issues that seem at best tangential to the
controversy. 53 This is particularly true given that Rawls wants to ex-
clude from the political debate not only moral and philosophical ar-
guments based on religious views, but also secular arguments that
citizens make "in terms of comprehensive nonreligious doctrines,"5 4
even when those arguments are "reflective and critical, publicly intelli-
gible and rational."55
49 Id. (emphasis added). Elsewhere in his article, Rawls makes the point that "[t]he
family must ensure the nurturing and development of... citizens [who have a sense of
justice and the political virtues that support political and social institutions] in appropriate
numbers to maintain an enduring society." Id. at 788. In an accompanying footnote,
Rawls adds that
no particular form of the family (monogamous, heterosexual, or otherwise)
is required by a political conception ofjustice so long as the family is ar-
ranged to fulfill these tasks effectively and doesn't run afoul of other polit-
ical values. Note that this observation sets the way in which justice as
fairness deals with the question of gay and lesbian rights and duties, and
how they affect the family. If these rights and duties are consistent with
orderly family life and the education of children, they are, ceteris paribus,
fully admissible.
Id. at 788 n.60.
50 See Ball, supra note 36, at 1875-77; Chai R. Feldblum, The Normative Good of Same-
Sex Marriage (Jan. 5, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
51 See Ball, supra note 36, at 1877-78.
52 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
53 Rawls's proviso allows for the incorporation of comprehensive doctrines into the
political debate as an initial matter. See supra note 43. Eventually, however, these compre-
hensive doctrines must find a common ground within the narrower political values that
political liberalism allows. See id.
54 Rawls, supra note 21, at 775.
55 Id. at 780. Rawls posits that
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For example, asking gay men and lesbians to justify a societal rec-
ognition of same-sex marriage primarily on the need of the political
society to reproduce itself, in order, presumably, to attain the neces-
sary reciprocity from opponents of gay rights, is awkward, given that
one of the main arguments against same-sex marriage is that neither
two men nor two women can engage in reproduction. By limiting the
appropriate boundaries of political discourse involving same-sex mar-
riage to the issue of reproduction, Rawls unintentionally joins hands
with natural law thinkers who argue that reproductive acts are a fun-
damental part of marriage.56 While it is true that Rawls speaks of the
reproduction of society and not of individuals per se, 5 7 society cannot
reproduce unless its members procreate. As Rawls acknowledges, the
family plays a crucial role in society because it is "the basis of the or-
derly production and reproduction of society and its culture from one
generation to the next."58
Thus, Rawls's limits on public reason would not necessarily create
an overlapping consensus on so-called political values that gay men
and lesbians could accept.5 9 Similarly, the conservative opponents of
a central feature of political liberalism is that it views all ... arguments
[based on comprehensive nonreligious doctrines] the same way it views reli-
gious ones, and therefore these secular philosophical doctrines do not pro-
vide public reasons. Secular concepts and reasoning of this kind belong to
first philosophy and moral doctrine, and fall outside of the domain of the
political.
Id.
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson provide a helpful contrast to Rawls's vision of
public reasoning. See Amr GuTm & DENNs THotss'soN, DmeocRAc, AND DIsAGREmEN"
(1996). In their argument for greater deliberation in American democracy, Gutmann and
Thompson acknowledge that moral arguments have a role to play in political discourse,
even though some of those arguments will ultimately be irreconcilable: "Citizens are more
likely to recognize what is morally at stake in a dispute if they employ moral reasoning in
trying to resolve it. Deliberation helps sort out self-interested claims from public-spirited
ones. Among the latter, deliberation helps identify those that have greater weight." Id. at
43. While it is true that "[mi]oral argument can arouse moral fanatics .... it can also
combat their claims on their own terms." Id at 44. In the end, Gutmann and Thompson
call for an extension of "the domain of deliberation." Id Rawls does not approve of Gut-
mann and Thompson's approach; he states, without elaboration, that it "seems to work
from a comprehensive doctrine." Rawls, supra note 21, at 770 n.19.
56 SeeJohn M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv.
1049, 1064 (1994); Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagina-
tion, 84 GEo. LJ. 301, 302 (1995).
57 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
58 Bawls, supra note 21, at 788.
59 For a more optimistic gay rights perspective on the value of Rawls's limitations on
public reason as they apply to same-sex marriage, see Linda C. McClain, Deliberative Democ-
racy, Overlapping Consensus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 66 FoRDHAm L. Rv. 1241, 1248-52
(1998). While Bawls's limits on public reason are understandably appealing to liberal sup-
porters of gay rights, those limits are ultimately too convenient. The limits permit those of
us who are liberal supporters of gay rights to emphasize our values, such as tolerance and
autonomy, while characterizing our opponents' values as beyond the permissible bounda-
ries of public reason because those values are based on "comprehensive doctrines."
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gay rights are not likely to abide by the limitations on public reason
that political liberalism requires.60 This failure of reciprocity suggests
that Rawls incorrectly believes that his political values can create an
overlapping consensus among most participants in the same-sex mar-
riage debate. In an attempt to separate political values from moral
ones, Rawls excludes most of the real-life participants and their real-
life concerns. What remains, as communitarians like to point out, is a
rather sterile account of a debate over policy and rights that has no
correspondence to people's real lives or their commitments and at-
tachments to their nonpolitical communities. This account asks indi-
viduals to separate what they believe is good and valuable in their lives
and communities from what they believe is fair and just as a matter of
public policy.
After recognizing that citizens inevitably include notions of the
good and valuable in their public reasoning, the next crucial step is to
understand how individuals develop these notions and to determine
what their role should be in public policy discussions involving issues
of justice. Communitarians argue that the myriad of communities to
which individuals belong (e.g., families, schools, churches, and neigh-
borhoods) play a crucial role in the formation of that which individu-
als believe is good, valuable, and just.61 Unlike Rawls, who
purposefully seeks to separate political citizens from the values they
hold as members of nonpolitical communities, communitarians ad-
vance the view that political citizens are fully embedded in the shared
traditions and norms of their nonpolitical communities. 62 Com-
munitarians argue that individuals in the real world do not exist prior
to their ends or make moral or political decisions that involve ques-
tions ofjustice disconnected from their ties to other human beings. 63
60 See Robert P. George, Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality,
106 YAT-E L.J. 2475, 2495-2501 (1997); see also Feldblum, supra note 50, at 15 ("[If a signifi-
cant number of lawmakers make legislative decisions based on their personal normative
and moral assessments, the fact that advocates of liberal neutrality can cleverly sidestep
such assessments may mean [simply] that such advocates have retreated from the battle-
field on which the real war is being waged." (footnote omitted)).
61 See, e.g., AMrrAi ETziorI, THE SPiRrr OF COMMUNrr. RIGHTS, RESPONSILITIES, AND
THE COMMuN TARIAN AGENDA 4-18 (1993); MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMocRAGs DiscoNTEN-
AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 348-51 (1996).
62 See infra notes 63-66, 162-67 and accompanying text.
63 Christopher Lasch argues that
[t]he dispute between communitarians and liberals hinges on opposing
conceptions of the self. Where liberals conceive of the self as essentially
unencumbered and free to choose among a wide range of alternatives,
communitarians insist that the self is situated in and constituted by tradi-
tion, membership in a historically rooted community.
Christopher Lasch, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalhm, in COMMUNrrv IN AMERICA: THE
CHALLENGE OF H-BmI7 OF TZE HERT173, 174-175 (Charles H. Reynolds & Ralph V. Nor-
man eds., 1988); see alsoJean Bethke Elshtain, The Communitarian Individua in NEW CONs-
MUNrrARIAN THINKING, supra note 1, at 99, 105 (arguing that unlike "the standpoint of
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Instead, individuals have many ties of friendship, obligation, and loy-
alty, which give them their sense of identity and bind them inextrica-
bly to the lives and well-being of others. 64 These ties, which
communitarians contend liberals like Rawls largely ignore, provide
the best understanding of what holds communities together and cre-
ates the necessary conditions for freedom and justice.65 According to
communitarians, a theory of political morality is seriously flawed if it
does not consider the role that the links among human beings play in
establishing and promoting justice and equality.6 6 Communitarians
argue, then, that a vision of individuals inextricably linked to their
communities is consistent with the descriptive reality of most people's
lives and appropriate as an ideal to which a theory of political morality
and democracy should aspire. The remainder of this Article explores
whether this communitarian vision, which Michael Sandel and
Michael Walzer present in different ways, provides a viable theoretical
foundation for gay rights positions.
II
MICHAEL SANDEL AND THE ROLE OF COMMfvUNrrY
In the introduction to the second edition of his book Liberalism
and the Limits of Justice, Michael Sandel argues that some commenta-
tors improperly group two critiques of liberalism under the heading
extreme individualism, with its thin view of the self, the [communitarian] self is 'thick,'
more particularly situated, a historical being who acknowledges that he or she has many
debts and obligations and that one's history and the history of one's society frame one's
own starting point").
64 See generally ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMIETMNT IN AMERIucAN LIFE (1985) (analyzing the results of four research projects that
studied how love and marriage, psychotherapy, voluntary associations, and political organi-
zations affect the private and public lives of individuals).
65 See, e.g., THE CoMuN1TARIAN CHALLENGE TO LIBERALISM, supra note 1, passim
66 See GLENDON, supra note 4, at 137. Glendon notes that
[giroups are important, not for their own sake, but for their roles in setting
the conditions under which individuals can flourish and order their lives
together. Because individuals are partly constituted in and through their
relationships with others, a liberal politics dedicated to full and free human
development cannot afford to ignore the settings that are most conducive
to the fulfillment of that ideal. In so doing, liberal politics neglects the
conditions for its own maintenance.
Id. The communitarian critique of liberalism "illustrate[s] the consequences for political
discourse of assuming situated selves rather than unencumbered selves. [Communitarians]
see[ ] political discourse as proceeding within the common meanings and traditions of a
political community, not appealing to a critical standpoint wholly external to those mean-
ings." Sandel, supra note 9, at 10; see also Moody, supra note 9, at 97
("[C]ommunitarianism sees public life as a constitutive feature of human identity, and
thus a necessary part of a good life... not simply as an instrument for purely private ends.
Liberalism has few, if any, conceptual tools to describe or justify such a view of the public
realm.").
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of communitarianism. 67 Sandel contends that both critiques seek to
link the right (or justice) to the good, but they do so in different
ways.68 The first "holds that principles of justice derive their moral
force from values commonly espoused or widely shared in a particular
community or tradition."69 It is this vision, which as we will see in Part
I is promoted by Michael Walzer, that according to Sandel is prop-
erly labeled communitarian, because under it, "arguments always take
the form of recalling a community to itself, of appealing to ideals im-
plicit but unrealized in a common project or tradition."70
According to Sandel, the second way of linking justice to the
good is not so much "strictly speaking, communitarian" as it is
"perfectionist":
[This second method] holds that principles of justice depend for
their justification on the moral worth or intrinsic good of the ends
they serve. On this view, the case for recognizing a right depends
on showing that it honors or advances some important human
good. Whether this good happens to be widely prized or implicit in
the traditions of the community would not be decisive. 71
Sandel categorizes the first method of linking justice to the good
as "insufficient" because "[t]he mere fact that certain practices are
sanctioned by the traditions of a particular community is not enough
to make them just."72 The limits of liberalism are similar because it
"tr[ies] to avoid passing judgment on the content of the ends that
rights promote. '73 As an alternative, Sandel proposes "that rights
[should] depend for their justification on the moral importance of
the ends they serve."74
The main thrust of Sandel's argument in Liberalism and the Limits
ofJustice is a critique of Rawlsian liberalism; he criticizes Rawlsian liber-
alism for, among other things, its Kantian view of the individual as an
unencumbered self that is disconnected from its ends and its commu-
nities. Sandel argues that the "Rawlsian self is . . . an antecedently
individuated subject, standing always at a certain distance from the
interests it has."75
67 See MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OFJUSTICE at ix-xi (2d ed. 1998).
68 See id. at x.
69 1&
70 Id. at xi.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 62. According to Sandel, this view of the self
rules out the possibility of any attachment ... able to reach beyond our
values and sentiments to engage our identity itself. It rules out the possibil-
ity of a public life in which, for good or ill, the identity as well as the inter-
ests of the participants could be at stake. And it rules out the possibility
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In his more recent book, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of
a Public Philosophy,76 Sandel continues his critique of liberalism, while
at the same time promoting his civic republican brand of communi-
tarianism as an alternative theory of political philosophy. In Part lI.A,
I explore what Sandel means by civic republicanism as set forth in
Democracy's Discontent. In Part ll.B, I evaluate Sandel's ideas from a gay
rights perspective.
A. The Civic Republicanism of Michael Sandel
While Sandel's critique of liberalism in Liberalism and the Limits of
Justice was mostly conceptual, his more recent work provides a detailed
review of American history, culture, and Supreme Court jurispru-
dence.77 The American nation, Sandel argues, has come to define
itself as a liberal procedural republic, constructed on a voluntarist vi-
sion of personhood that does not concern itself with particular ends
but with the capacity of individuals to choose their own ends.78 Ac-
cording to this vision, the procedural republic aims to enforce and
promote individual rights of autonomy and does not require its citi-
zens to abide by agreements that they do not choose voluntarily.79
In contrast to the procedural republic promoted by liberalism,
civic republicanism is very much concerned with a particular end,
namely, greater self-government by citizens.
Instead of defining rights according to principles that are neutral
among conceptions of the good, republican theory interprets rights
in the light of a particular conception of the good society-the self-
governing republic. In contrast to the liberal claim that the right is
prior to the good, republicanism thus affirms a politics of the com-
mon good.80
that common purposes and ends could inspire more or less expansive self-
understandings and so define a community in the constitutive sense, a com-
munity describing the subject and notjust the objects of shared aspirations.
Id.
76 SANDEL, supra note 61.
77 See id.
78 See id. at 4.
79 See id.
80 Id. at 25. Robert Fowler has summarized the views of civic republicans as follows:
[They] share a vision of a polity where the common good rules and public
concerns triumph over the goals of the self-interested individual. The ideal
is a place where citizens are united in public action and public spiritedness,
reinforced by a rough equality, common respect, and basic human virtues,
above all where 'disinterested regard for the welfare of the whole [or]
civi[c] virtue,' holds sway.
FoWLER, supra note 22, at 63 (quoting RALPH KETcHAm, INDIVIDUALISM AND PUBUC LIFE: A
MODERN DiIavMA 163 (1987)).
Civic republicanism and its role in constitutional adjudication has its proponents and
detractors in the legal academy. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism, and
IsIt Worth Reviving?, 102 Htv. L. REv. 1695 (1989) (detractor); Steven G. Gey, The Unfortu-
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Sandel's portrayal of the tension between liberalism and republi-
canism has both descriptive and normative components. The descrip-
tive component is largely an historical account of the legal and
political struggle between the liberal and civic republican traditions in
the United States dating back to the American Revolution.81 For our
purposes, the most relevant part of this historical account addresses
issues of constitutional adjudication and rights.8 2 Before exploring
Sandel's normative vision of civic republicanism, a summary of this
historical critique of the Supreme Court's liberal interpretation of the
Bill of Rights is therefore necessary.
1. Constitutional Adjudication
According to Sandel, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution has contributed greatly to the entrenchment of the lib-
eral procedural republic.8 3 The Court's constitutional jurisprudence,
particularly in the last few decades, has prioritized the right over the
good, "the ideal of neutrality, and the conception of persons as freely
choosing, unencumbered selves."'84
Sandel reminds us, however, that a liberal conception of rights
has not always been predominant in American history. He points out
that "the Bill of Rights [did not] play an important role in protecting
individual liberties against federal infringement" 85 during its first one
hundred years, because "[I]iberty in the early republic had less to do
with individual guarantees against government action than with the
dispersion of power among branches and levels of government."8 6
During the early part of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court,
intent on promoting individual rights over ideals of self-government
and the common good, superceded the republican way of protecting
freedom (i.e., promoting civic virtue and dispersed government).87
For example, in Lochner v. New York, 88 the Court "established the prior-
ity of right in the sense of rights as trumps" by ranking the right of
nate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 801 (1993) (detractor); Symposium: The
Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (detractors and proponents); Nomi
Maya Stolzenberg, A Book of Laughter and Forgetting: Kalman's "Strange Career" and the Market-
ing of Civic Republicanism, 111 H v. L. REv. 1025 (1998) (book review) (proponent).
81 See generally SANDEL, supra note 61 (reflecting on the entrenchment of the public
philosophy of the liberal state in the United States' constitutional, political, and economic
institutions).
82 See id. at 25-119.
83 See id. at 28.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 38.
86 Id.
87 See id. at 40-42.
88 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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individuals to enter into contracts higher than the attainment of what
the legislature perceived to be the societal good.8 9
Sandel explains that once the Court viewed constitutional rights
as trumps for individuals to pit against the majoritarian will, the ights
were subject to criticism as contrary to democratic principles.90 This
situation compelled promoters of the liberal procedural republic to
develop a theory of rights consistent with democratic processes. 91 Ac-
cording to Sandel, Justice Stone accomplished this feat in United States
v. Carolene Products.92 Sandel views the need to place a liberal, rights-
oriented jurisprudence within the context of protecting democratic
processes from prejudice as Justice Stone's driving motivation in that
case, as indicated by the Justice's call for a "more searching judicial
inquiry" when laws target "particular religious, or national, or racial
minorities."93
The Court, then, by viewing rights as trumps and by adhering to
strict neutrality regarding ends, has contributed to the creation and
promotion of the procedural liberal republic. Despite the liberal
predilections of the Court, Sandel notes that judicial opinions in this
century have sometimes reflected a republican view of the Constitu-
tion; however, subsequent interpretations that were more consistent
with the procedural republic quickly overwhelmed the republican
view. For example, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,94 the Court
upheld a law requiring the saluting of the flag in public schools be-
cause the law was "a legitimate way of cultivating the communal iden-
tity of [the] citizens."9 5 Only three years later, however, the Court
reversed direction in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,96
when it struck down a similar statute by reasoning that the judiciary
needed to (1) prioritize individual rights over what the majority of
society considered the good,9 7 and (2) guarantee that the Constitu-
89 SANDEL, supra note 61, at 43.
90 See id. at 43.
91 See id. at 43-47.
92 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
93 SANDEL, supra note 61, at 49 (quoting Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4).
94 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
95 SANDEL, supra note 61, at 53. According to Justice Frankfurter,
The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sen-
timent. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and
spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions of a people, transmit
them from generation to generation, and thereby create the continuity of a
treasured common life which constitutes a civilization.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 596.
96 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
97 See SANDEL, supra note 61, at 54. Justice Jackson penned this return to liberal polit-
ical theory: "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and offi-
cials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." Barnette, 319
U.S. at 638.
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tion remain "neutral among ends [and] that government.., not im-
pose a particular conception of the good life."98
The flag laws have a particular resonance for Sandel because he
approves of government's attempts to inculcate civic virtue in its citi-
zens. 99 But the Court ultimately viewed such an effort as illegitimate
in Barnette because "[p] atriotism [is] a matter of choice, not of incul-
cation, a voluntary act by free and independent selves. A sense of
community would flow from a sense of justice rather than the other
way around."u00
Furthermore, the Court's privacy jurisprudence presents an ex-
ample for Sandel of the Court's shift from a theory of constitutional
interpretation that incorporates issues of morality and the good to
one that avoids dealing with such issues.' 10 The former is illustrated
by Griswold v. Connecticut,10 2 where the Court struck down on norma-
tive grounds a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives. 0 3 Ac-
cording to Sandel, the Court justified the right of privacy in Griswold
by employing substantive moral judgment as opposed to voluntarist
theory: "[T]he Court vindicated privacy not for the sake of letting
people lead their sexual lives as they choose, but rather for the sake of
affirming and protecting the social institution of marriage."'0 4
In later privacy cases, however, the Court limited its moral out-
look to a voluntarist view of personhood and the need to protect indi-
98 SANDEL, supra note 61, at 54. Justice Jackson added that
[f]ree public education, if faithful to the ideal of secular instruction and
political neutrality, will not be partisan or enemy of any class, creed, party,
or faction.... If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what is orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
99 Sandel argues that "[tjhe republican tradition accords to politics and to law a form-
ative project. The formative project consists in worrying about the conditions of life-of
social and cultural and political and economic life-that shape the virtues, the habits, and
dispositions of citizens." MichaelJ. Sandel, The Constitution of the Procedural Republic: Liberal
Rights and Civic Virtues, Order of the Coif Annual Lecture, 66 FoRDHAms L. REv. 1, 3 (1997).
100 SANDEL, supra note 61, at 54.
Subsequent to the publication of Democracys Discontent Sandel, in response to a ques-
tion following an Order of the Coif lecture, stated that he might have concurred rather
than dissented in Barnette because "compulsory flag salutes [are not] very effective, given
the[ir] purpose." Sandel, supra note 99, at 17.
101 See SANDEL, supra note 61, at 94-100.
102 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
103 See id. at 486.
104 SANDEL, supra note 61, at 96. The Griswold Court argued that
[m]arriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully endur-
ing, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life ... a harmony in living... a bilateral loyalty .... [Ilt
is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
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vidual autonomy.10 5 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,10 6 the Court, in order to
protect the personal autonomy of individuals to live however they
choose, struck down a law prohibiting the distribution of contracep-
tives.10 7 Sandel identifies the Court's theoretical switch as a redescrip-
don of privacy rights bearers from "persons qua participants in the
social institution of marriage to persons qua individuals, independent
of their roles or attachments."'0 8 Sandel notes a similar allegiance to
a voluntarist conception of privacy in the abortion cases. 10 9 As an ex-
ample, he cites the joint opinion by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1 0 which explained that "[a]t the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State.""'
Sandel argues that the dissenting opinions in Bowers v. Hard-
wick 1 2 provide another example of the Court's voluntarist perspec-
105 See SANDEL, supra note 61, at 97-100.
106 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
107 See id. at 455.
108 SAmDEL, supra note 61, at 97. According to the Eisenstadt Court, "Tilt is true that in
Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital
couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of
two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup." Eisenstadt, 405
U.S. at 453.
Furthermore, Sandel believes that the Eisenstadt Court shifted from the "old" notion of
privacy-as first proposed by Brandeis-that had as a primary rationale the need to protect
individuals from governmental intrusion and surveillance, to a "new" notion of privacy that
primarily focuses on protecting voluntary choice:
More than freedom from surveillance or disclosure of intimate affairs, the
right to privacy would now protect the freedom to engage in certain activi-
ties without governmental restriction. Whereas privacy in Griswold pre-
vented intrusion into "the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms," privacy in
Eisenstadt prevented intrusion into decisions of certain kinds.... The Court
protected privacy in Eisenstad4 not for the social practices it promotes but
for the individual choice it secures.
SANDEL, supra note 61, at 97 (quoting Griswod, 381 U.S. at 485).
109 See SANDEL, supra note 61, at 98-100.
110 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
111 Id. at 851.
Sandel is critical of the Court's purported abidance by moral bracketing when decid-
ing whether and, if so, how the state should regulate abortions. See SANDEL, supra note 61,
at 100-03. According to Sandel, the Court contends that the Constitution requires neutral-
ity on the question of when life begins. See id. at 101. However, the Court clearly asserted
that the state has a compelling interest at the moment of viability. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 163 (1973). By making viability the point at which the interest of the state
changed, the Court, despite its denials, staked out a moral position on when life begins.
See SANDEL, supra note 61, at 101. Sandel argues that the Court cannot feasibly decide
these difficult issues of constitutional law within the confines of moral bracketing. See id. at
100-03.
112 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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tive. 113 According to Sandel, the Bowers dissenters had two options
when elucidating how a constitutional right to privacy can include the
right to engage in homosexual conduct.114 One possibility was the
substantive moral approach, which
claims that much that is valuable in conventional marriage is also
present in homosexual unions.... It defends homosexual privacy
in the way Griswold defended marital privacy, by arguing that like
marriage, homosexual union may also be "intimate to the degree of
being sacred . . .a harmony in living . .. a bilateral loyalty," an
association for a "noble purpose."115
In contrast, Sandel argues that the approach the dissenters actually
chose in Bowers relied solely on notions of voluntarism and autonomy:
Instead of defending homosexual intimacies in terms of the human
goods they share with intimacies already protected by the Court,
Justice Blackmun cast the Court's earlier cases in individualist
terms, and found their connection with the homosexual case in the
idea that "much of the richness of a relationship wil come from the
freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these
intensely personal bonds."116
The liberal theory behind the procedural republic, which accord-
ing to Sandel pervades the Court's constitutional rulings, insists on a
form of state neutrality that asks citizens, who challenge governmental
action or who seek protection through governmental policies,"17 to
bracket their identities "for the sake of political agreement."118 This
bracketing has a tremendous cost because it attains a superficial toler-
ance that alienates citizens from their government and community:
"Respecting persons as unencumbered selves may afford a kind of so-
113 See SANDEL, supra note 61, at 103-08.
114 See id. at 104.
115 Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
116 Id. at 104-05 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Sandel
adds that
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, also avoided reference to the values
homosexual intimacy may share with heterosexual love. Instead, he wrote
broadly of "the individual's right to make certain unusually important deci-
sions" and "respect for the dignity of individual choice," rejecting the no-
tion that such liberty belongs to heterosexuals alone: "From the standpoint
of the individual, the homosexual and the heterosexual have the same in-
terest in deciding how he will live his own life, and, more narrowly, how he
will conduct himself in his personal and voluntary associations with his
companions."
Id. at 105 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
117 As examples of citizens who were successful in petitioning their governments for
protection, but who lost that protection when courts prioritized the rights of individuals
over the needs of the community, Sandel points to (1) Jews in Skokie, Illinois, who wanted
to keep Nazis from marching in their town, and (2) feminists in Indianapolis who wanted
to protect women from the ill effects of pornography. See id, at 85-88.
118 Id. at 116.
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cial peace, but it is unlikely to realize the higher pluralism of persons
and communities who appreciate and affirm the distinctive goods
their different lives express."119
According to Sandel, the norms behind the procedural republic
are not limited to constitutional adjudication because they also affect
every facet of American life; that is, the same vision of the unencum-
bered self, free from all duties and responsibilities not freely chosen,
cuts across legal, political, and economic spheres.120 Sandel argues
that this effect on society creates a sense of disillusionment among
Americans as their communal identities become disconnected from
their identities as citizens participating in a democracy.121 Ultimately,
the procedural republic has produced a displacement of community
and left Americans isolated from each other, confused, and anxious
about social institutions that are unresponsive to their needs.
2. Normative Position
Sandel proposes a clear normative vision in his portrayal of the
tension between liberalism and republicanism: He wants to replace
the moral brackets of the procedural republic with a vision of govern-
ment and of private economic forces that promotes the particular end
of greater self-govemment for citizens.122 Sandel notes that "[t]he re-
119 Id.
120 While for purposes of this Article Sandel's arguments regarding constitutional ad-
judication are more relevant than his views on the political economy, a brief summary of
the latter would be helpful. Sandel frames the current debates about economic policy
within a paradigm that highlights the tension between prosperity (emphasized by free mar-
ket liberals) and fair distributive principles (emphasized by egalitarian liberals). See id. at
278-97. He argues, however, that this has not always been the framework under which
debates about the political economy have occurred in this country. Instead, Sandel con-
tends that our history includes a third view that conceives economic policies as a means for
the promotion of civic virtue and a greater degree of self-government. See id. at 124-67.
Thomas Jefferson's opposition to large-scale manufacturers espoused this view, which
had a basis "primarily on moral and civic grounds; the agrarian way of life was most likely
to produce the kind of citizens self-government requires." Id. at 142. The notion of the
economy as a tool for inculcating civic virtue remained even after the forces of industrial
capitalism changed the vision of an agrarian American forever. For example, republican
promoters of free labor in the second half of the nineteenth century "sought to reform the
economy along lines hospitable to republican ideals," id. at 184, by creating an economy
"that produced virtuous, independent citizens, capable of self-government." Id. at 200.
While Brandeis and others in the Progressive era tried to abide by a vision of a republi-
can economy, the growing prominence of a voluntarist conception of economics finally
displaced this ideal. See id. at 201-49. Even those who opposed unrestrained free markets
wanted reforms that would make the conditions for the free exchange of labor more volun-
tary and fair. See id. Thus, the two-punch strategy of the procedural republic was finally in
place: the same form of governmental neutrality and protection of individual choice that
was at the core of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence reappeared in the economic
policies of John Maynard Keynes's New Deal liberalism, see id. at 262, and in the subse-
quent, more pure free market ideas of economists such as Milton Friedman, see id. at 285.
121 See id. at 321-24.
122 See id. at 6.
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publican conception of freedom, unlike the liberal conception, re-
quires a formative politics, a politics that cultivates in citizens the
qualities of character self-government requires."123 How the nation
can achieve this normative vision in practice, however, is less clear. If
the procedural republic is as entrenched as Sandel contends, the most
important private and public American institutions would require sig-
nificant structural changes.
Only at the end of Democracy's Discontent does Sandel propose a
method for reversing the hegemony of the procedural republic.' 24
He argues for both an upward and downward dispersal of sovereignty
from the nation-state: "The most promising alternative to the sover-
eign state is ... a multiplicity of communities and political bodies-
some more, some less extensive than nations-among which sover-
eignty is diffused."1 25
In the international context, Sandel believes that new forms of
political association that do not completely overlap with nation-states
may help "rival [the] global market forces."126 To create these enti-
ties, Sandel suggests providing "greater cultural and political auton-
omy to subnational communities . . . even while strengthening and
democratizing transnational structures, such as the European
Union."127
In the domestic arena, Sandel argues that "federalism is more
than a theory of intergovernmental relations.' 128 He notes that feder-
alism is about returning power not only to state and local govern-
ments, but also to nongovernmental communities. 129 In other words,
to the extent that the procedural republic's normative restrictions
bind state and local governments so that they also become inadequate
arenas for republican citizenship, Sandel urges the focus to move be-
yond governmental institutions. 130
Sandel concludes his discussion of civic republicanism by illustrat-
ing its practical and conceptual connections with the civil rights move-
ment of the 1950s and 1960s.' 31 The energy and voice that the
movement found within the communities and public spaces of Afri-
can-American churches provided the practical connection: "[T]he
civic education and social solidarity cultivated in the black Baptist
123 Id.
124 See id. at 345.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 347.
129 See id.
130 See id. at 348 ("[W]e must seek such public spaces as may be found amidst the
institutions of civil society-in schools and workplaces, churches and synagogues, trade
unions and social movements.").
131 See id. at 314, 348-49.
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churches of the South were a crucial prerequisite for the civil rights
movement that ultimately unfolded on a national scale." 13 2 According
to Sandel, the fact that the movement concerned itself with more than
individual rights illustrates the conceptual connection to civic
republicanism:
More than a means to equal rights, the movement itself was a mo-
ment of empowerment, an instance of the civic strand of freedom.
The laws that desegregated public facilities and secured voting
rights for blacks served freedom in the voluntarist sense-the free-
dom to choose and pursue one's purposes and ends. But the strug-
gle to win these rights displayed a higher, republican freedom-the
freedom that consists in acting collectively to shape the public
world.' 38
Sandel argues that this notion of community participation in
American democracy as a means of promoting and guaranteeing free-
dom is one that, despite its historic roots, the liberal procedural re-
public has largely superceded. 3 4 The result is a public discourse and
a democracy that are rich in procedural guarantees and individual
rights, but poor in substantive moral content, common purpose, and
sense of civic unity.13 5
B. Sandel from a Gay Rights Perspective
Unlike other communitarian philosophers, such as Michael
Walzer, Charles Taylor, and Alasdair MacIntyre, Sandel discusses ho-
mosexuality at some length in his writings. 136 Sandel therefore de-
serves credit for attempting to fit homosexuality within his republican
conception of the good.
This attempt, however, has produced mixed results. For exam-
ple, the Sandellian notion of communities as sources of identity and
freedom for their members is one that should ring true for many gay
men and lesbians. 137 Unfortunately, when discussing the role of com-
munities, Sandel ignores those communities that have the greatest
value for gay men and lesbians, namely, those created through the
autonomous acts of individuals.138 In addition, the Sandellian cri-
tique of moral bracketing in matters of public reasoning is a notion
132 Id. at 314.
133 Id. at 348.
134 See id. at 348-51.
135 See id.
136 See id. at 103-08; Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion
and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REv. 521,533-38 (1989); MichaelJ. Sandel, Political Liberalism,
107 H v. L. REv. 1765, 1786-89 (1994) (reviewing JOHN RAwLs, PoLcAL LIBERALISM
(1993)).
137 See infra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
138 See infra notes 164-79 and accompanying text.
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that gay men and lesbians should at least consider, even if welcoming
issues of morality into political debates about homosexuality seems
counter-intuitive.' 3 9 Sandel, however, does not limit his critique of
moral bracketing to public reasoning; he also wants the moral brack-
ets removed as a matter of constitutional interpretation. Gay men and
lesbians (and their supporters) should reject this suggestion.140
1. Sandellian Communities
Perhaps to a greater extent than any other contemporary Ameri-
can communitarian, Sandel has formulated a trenchant critique of the
atomistic individual-one uncoupled from attachments and commu-
nities-in liberal political philosophy.141 The experiences of gay men
and lesbians reflect this criticism and confirm its validity. Because of
the hostility that emanates from the broader society, a gay or lesbian
individual has extreme difficulty attaining true freedom and dignity by
remaining isolated from gay and lesbian communities. 142 This isola-
tion usually means a life in the closet-a life without much satisfaction
or fulfillment-in which lies and deception constantly undermine an
individual's sense of self-worth. Only when the homosexual comes
out of the closet, when she declares that she is a member of a commu-
nity that comes together, at least initially, on the basis of a different
sexual orientation, does an opportunity arise for the individual to at-
tain a level of dignity and self-worth commensurate with leading a
truly autonomous existence. As Kath Weston has noted,
[i]n coming out, a person acts to create a sense of wholeness by
establishing congruence between interior experience and external
presentation, moving the inner into the outer, bringing the hidden
to light, and transforming a private into a social reality. The closet
symbolizes isolation, the individual without society, a stranger even
to self. Its imagery is consistent with the atomistic conceptions of a
society in which individuated actors must struggle to communicate
and gain legitimacy for private truths.143
139 See infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
140 See infra Part II.B.2.
141 See SANDEL, supra note 61.
142 Many types of these communities exist, including inter alia friends, families, pa-
trons of bars and coffeehouses, and members of political, religious, athletic, and social
organizations. See generally SIMON LEVAY & ELISABETH NONAS, CrIY OF FRIENDs: A PORTRAIT
OF THE GAY AND LESBIAN COMMUNITY IN AMEIucA (1995) (discussing gay and lesbian com-
munities in the United States). For a discussion of the role of these communities in the
lives of gay men and lesbians, see infra notes 143-55, 174-90 and accompanying text.
143 KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP 50 (1991); see also
KRISTIN G. ESTERBERG, LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL IDENTITIES: CONSTRUCTING COMMUNITIES,
CONSTRUCTING SELVES 57 (1997) ("Many wvomen... experience coming out into a particu-
lar community or relationship as a way of finding their 'true selves.'").
[Vol. 85:443
COMMUNTARJANISM AND GAY RIGHTS
For gay men and lesbians, the process of coming out encapsulates
the duality of autonomy and community in their lives.'- 4 The initial
decision of whether to come out is mostly the individual's choice,
though the amount of support others provide may affect the timing of
the decision. The effect of coming out, however, is almost always a
decrease in the individual's isolation; the process of coming out often
embeds the individual into gay communities that contribute to the
formation of a gay or lesbian identity and provide protection from the
hostility emanating from the broader society.' 45
Many scholars have documented how gay and lesbian communi-
ties contribute to a sense of belonging and identity for homosexu-
als.146 This documentation is beyond the scope of this Article. A
144 See Mark Blasius, An Ethos of Lesbian and Gay Existence, 20 POL. THEORY 642, 662
(1992) ("Because coming out is such a personal ethical choice, made freely and deliber-
ately, the existence of a lesbian and gay people as a people, as a community... is limited by
the freedom of each ... individual to decide for her- or himself whether to come out and
become lesbian or gay.").
The duality of autonomy and community in the lives of gay men and lesbians is re-
flected in the fact that the two most common uses, in political parlance, of the word gay as
an adjective precede the nouns rights and community (as in gay ights and gay community).
145 See, e.g., GERSHEN KAUFMAN & LEV RAPHAEL, COMING OUT OF SHAME: TRANSFORMING
GAY AND LESBIAN LIVEs (1996); LAURA A. MARKOWE, REDEFINING THE SELF. COMING OUT AS
LESBIAN (1996); MARC E. VARGO, ACTS OF DISCLOSURE: THE COMING-OUT PROCESS OF CON-
TEMPORARY GAY MEN (1998).
146 See, e.g., GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK (1994); CREATING A PLACE FOR OUR-
SELVES: LESBIAN, GAY, AND BIsExuAL COMMUNrIY HISTORIES (Brett Beemyn ed., 1997);JoHN
D'EMIo, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNrIES (1983); ESTERBERG, supra note 143; ELIz-
ABETH LAPOVSKY KENNEDY & MADELINE D. DAVIS, BooTS OF LEATHER, SLIPPERS OF GOLD: THE
HISTORY OF A LESBIAN COMMUNITY (1993); PETER M. NARDI, GAY MEN'S FRIENDSHIPS: INVINCI-
BLE COMMUNITIES (1999); RURAL GAYS AND LESBIANS: BUILDING ON THE STRENGTHS OF COM-
MUNrTEs (James Donald Smith & RonaldJ. Mancoske eds., 1997); WESTON, supra note 143.
Instead of speaking of community, Mark Blasius prefers to speak of a gay and lesbian
ethos "by which [he] mean[s] a shared way of life through which lesbians and gay men
invent themselves, recognize each other, and establish a relationship to the culture in
which they live." Blasius, supra note 144, at 645. Blasius explains the emergence of the
ethos, which merges the self with the community, as follows:
[I]n the formation of an ethos, the earlier posed "How shall I live?" be-
comes inextricably connected to "How shall we live?" The stake that one has
in the morale and destiny of the local lesbian and gay community, that
makes one's "self" possible, becomes a stake in civic involvement in [a]
wider sociohistorical existence.., that may affect one's ability to come out
and live a lesbian and gay ethos ....
Id. at 659.
Some scholars, particularly those associated with postmodernism and queer theory,
question the very existence of objective categories such as identity and community. See,
e.g., ESTERBERG, supra note 143, at 15-16; ANNAMARIEJAGOSE, QUEER THEORY. AN INTRODUC-
TION 75-78 (1996); Shane Phelan, The Shape of Queer: Assimilation and Articulation, WOMEN &
POL., vol. 18, No. 2, 1997, at 55, 60-61. This Article does not address this important,
though complex, queer theory critique. I do, however, agree with Kristin Esterberg that
the refusal to recognize the existence of any identity can be as restrictive as the concept of
identity itself:
If one of the "goals" of a post-modem politics is to provide social spaces for
greater individual democracy and freedom, then to assume a uniform fluid-
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couple of references, however, can usefully illustrate why Sandel's vi-
sion of individuals attaining freedom, not only through the exercise of
individual autonomy as promoted by liberalism but also through par-
ticipation in communities, is one that rings true for many gay men
and lesbians. For example, in his book on the lives of gay men in New
York City at the beginning of the twentieth century, the historian
George Chauncey asserts that those men
were able to construct spheres of relative cultural autonomy in the
interstices of a city governed by hostile powers. They forged an im-
mense gay world of overlapping social networks in the city's streets,
private apartments, bathhouses, cafeterias, and saloons, and they
celebrated that world's existence at regularly held communal events
such as the massive drag (or transvestite) balls that attracted
thousands of participants and spectators in the 1920s. 147
These communal attachments provided gay men with personal
freedom, a sense of self-worth and identity, and protection from the
hostility of the broader society long before anyone argued thatjudicially
enforced rights of individual freedom should provide any sense of aid
or protection to homosexuals. As Chauncey notes,
[a] long with sexual camaraderie, [the gay community] offered [gay
men] practical support in negotiating the demands of urban life,
for many people used their gay social circles to find jobs, apart-
ments, romance, and their closest friendships. Their regular associ-
ation and ties of mutual dependence fostered their allegiance to
one another, but gay culture was even more important to them for
the emotional support it provided as they developed values and
identities significantly different from those prescribed by the domi-
nant culture. 148
Thus, Chauncey argues that the notion of gay men living in isola-
tion and invisibility before the Stonewall riots of 1969 and the birth of
the modem gay rights movement is a myth. 149 Part of the reason for
this myth may be the liberal view that gay individuals cannot lead satis-
fying and fulfilling lives in the absence of the recognition and enforce-
ment of individual rights. Imagining gay men and lesbians living
freely and with dignity prior to the time when society recognized indi-
vidual rights to autonomy and privacy as legitimate entitlements is dif-
ficult under this limited liberal view. As Chauncey illustrates,
however, rights did not create community. Instead, gay men seeking
ity is equally as narrow and restrictive as enforcing a uniform essential-
ism .... For some, identities provide an anchor and stability that is
welcomed-as well as a potential basis for political mobilization.
EsrERBERG, supfra note 143, at 171.
147 CHAUNcay, supra note 146, at 2.
148 Id. at 2-3.
149 See id.
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to find and support each other created community; the oppression
emanating from the society at large contributed to the formation of
gay communities decades before it caused the formation of the gay
rights movement.15 0
A similar description of the role of community applies to lesbians.
Elizabeth Lapovsky Kennedy and Madeline Davis, in their analysis of
the role of bars in the lives of lesbians in Buffalo in the 1930s and
1940s, note that
[b]y coming together in public places, lesbians began to challenge
the sexist and homophobic structures of U.S. society. They ex-
panded the possibilities for women to live independent lives away
from their families without men. They made it easier for lesbians to
find others like themselves and to develop a sense of camaraderie
and support. They also increased public awareness of the existence
of lesbians, as more people became familiar with gay bars....
Although they did not dramatically change sexism and
homophobia, they did begin to mitigate the disastrous effects of in-
dividual isolation and feelings of worthlessness. In doing this they
laid the groundwork for increasing solidarity and consciousness that
could lead to a political movement in the future.' 5 '
In more contemporary times, community retains an important
role in the lives of gay men and lesbians. Kath Weston, in her study of
homosexuals living in San Francisco, notes that
[d]uring the 1970s the concept of community came to embody
practical wisdom emerging from the bars, friendship networks, and
a spate of new gay organizations: the knowledge that lesbians and
gay men, joining together on the basis of a sexual identity, could
create enduring social ties. In the process, sexuality was reconsti-
tuted as a ground of common experience rather than a quintessentially
personal domain.152
In 1999, Peter Nardi published a book in which he explores the
influence that gay men's friendships, as a form of community, have on
the development and maintenance of gay men's identities.153 Nardi
asserts that "[f]riendship among gay men is a means toward learning
about one's gay identity and a source offreedom from the limitations
imposed by the culture on being able to live a gay life."'1 54 Moreover,
Nardi states that gay friendships, as well as,
150 See id. at 5-6.
151 See K y & DAVIS, supra note 146, at 65-66.
152 WESTON, supra note 143, at 123 (emphasis added); see also LEVAY & NONAS, supra
note 142, at 99-199 (describing the many types of communities gay men and lesbians have
created for themselves in different parts of the country).
153 See NARDi, supra note 146.
154 Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
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[p]articipation in the gay communities' institutions (bars, baths,
restaurants, book stores, media, political and social organizations,
etc.) contributes to gay identity achievement, and gay identity leads
to the creation and maintenance of gay communities which, in an
ongoing dialectic, provide a context for reproducing identity in a
newer generation of people searching for meaning and
friendship.155
Liberals generally pay insufficient attention to the role of com-
munities in helping marginalized individuals such as gay men and les-
bians attain personal freedom. In the specific context of sexual
orientation, many liberals believe that privacy is the most important
value for protecting gay men and lesbians from the rest of society.15 6
The protection of privacy has an intuitive appeal for liberals because it
grants the individual a zone of personal freedom with which the state
may not interfere. 157 The liberal can advocate the protection of this
zone without addressing the social or moral effects of the acts that
take place behind "closed doors." In fact, a primary purpose of pri-
vacy doctrine is to separate the value (or lack thereof) of conduct that
occurs in private from the right of the individual to engage in such
conduct.
While the liberal privacy model has some obvious benefits for gay
rights positions, it also has limitations. The privacy model "presumes
nothing about the primacy of sexual orientation for the political iden-
tity of individual gay men and women and nothing about belonging to
an actual 'gay community,' whose distinctive neighborhoods, norms,
culture, and social relations are structured around sexual practices
and erotic ties."'58 The model does not take into account those iden-
tities, social relationships, and communities that emanate directly
from the private expression of sexuality and whose effects go far be-
yond what transpires behind dosed doors. As Shane Phelan points
out,
[t] he liberal attempt to make sexuality simply a matter of what peo-
ple do in bed does not have the force of intuition behind it ....
The fundamental insight of both gay liberation and lesbian femi-
15 Id. at 195.
156 See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Democratic Sex: Reynolds v. U.S., Sexual Relations, and Com-
munity, in SEx, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY, supra note 16, at 63, 64-65; see also Kendall Thomas,
Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1431 (1992) (criticizing the emphasis that
gay rights proponents place on privacy theory and discourse).
157 See Richard F. Galvin, Moral Pluralism, Disintegration, and Liberalism, in THE LIBER-
AijsM-CoMMIrNiTArANSM DEBATE, supra note 1, at 39, 47 ("One hallmark of a liberal soci-
ety is the stipulation that there are spheres of conduct that lie beyond the limits of
legitimate government interference .... ").
158 Rosenblum, supra note 156, at 65.
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nism has been the need for counterexplanations of the role of sexu-
ality in personality organization as well as social structure. 159
By focusing on the right to engage in acts behind the veil of privacy
and by ignoring the consequences, including the community-building
consequences, of those acts, liberals blind themselves to the role of
"interconnections and interdependencies"' 60 in people's lives. As
Robin West notes, in the context of Supreme Court opinions,
"[p]rivacy cases, liberal rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, do
not by any stretch protect the isolated liberty right of individuals 'to
be left alone.' They protect the right of individuals to form independ-
ent societies of interaction with select others, within which the state
will not intrude."1 6 1
Many gay men and lesbians, then, can attest to Sandel's view that
communities assist individuals in forming identities and play a vital
role in the development of individual character and sense of self-
worth.1 6 2 As Sandel explains,
[c]ommunity... describe [s] not just a feeling but a mode of self-
understanding partly constitutive of the agent's identity.... [T]o
say that [individuals] are bound by a sense of community is not sim-
ply to say that a great many of them profess communitarian senti-
ments and pursue communitarian aims, but rather that they
conceive their identity.., as defined to some extent by the commu-
nity of which they are a part.1 65
It is essential, however, to clarify which communities are at issue.
In his writings, Sandel tends to discuss communities given to us,
namely, communities, such as family, school, church, neighborhood,
and nation, into which we are bom.'6 He argues that a theory of
political morality that does not recognize the importance of the at-
159 PHELAN, supra note 17, at 34; see also NAmIi, supra note 146, at 3 (noting, in discuss-
ing gay men and lesbians, that "to participate in spaces also occupied by others who have
grown up with a stigmatized identity and who may have experienced-despite other signifi-
cant differences-at least some similar forms of personal and social marginalization is a
sociopolitical connection, perhaps one of brotherhood and sisterhood"); Arend Soeteman,
Legal Moralism in Liberal Communities, in LAw, LIFE AND THE IMAGES OF MAN: MODES OF
THOUGHr IN MOD N LEGAL THEORY 577, 585 (1996) ("The collective goods of... commu-
nities represent values and ways of life which are shared: the value is in the sharing of the
values and ways of life. I enjoy them not as an individual but as [a] co-member.").
160 Robin West, Universalism, Liberal Theory, and the Problem of Gay Marriage, 25 FL-A. ST.
U. L. Rxv. 705, 710 (1998).
161 Id. at 721.
162 See SANDEL, supra note 67, at 150.
163 Id.
164 See, e.g., id. at 179. Sandel emphasizes
those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact
that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the par-
ticular persons we are-as members of this family or community or nation
or people, as bearers of this history, as sons and daughters of that revolu-
tion, as citizens of this republic.
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tachment between individuals and given communities fails to capture
the character and moral depth of human beings.' 65 As Sandel sug-
gests, "to have character is to know that I move in a history I neither
summon nor command, which carries consequences none the less for
my choices and conduct.' 66 Moreover, Sandel argues that liberalism
"cannot make sense of our moral experience, because it cannot ac-
count for certain moral and political obligations that we commonly
recognize, even prize. These include obligations of solidarity, reli-
gious duties, and other moral ties that may claim us for reasons unre-
lated to a choice.' 67
While Sandel greatly values given communities, he does not have
much interest in communities of choice, that is, communities formed
through the voluntary acts of their members. 168 In fact, Sandel criti-
cizes what he deems individualistic conceptions of community be-
cause they are instrumental; in other words, they are arranged so as to
advance the particular interests of their members. 169 According to
Sandel, the concepts community and choice are mutually exclusive; the
important constitutive function of community arises precisely from its
nonvoluntary components.'70 As Sandel explains, "[f] or [members of
a society], community describes not just what they have as fellow citi-
zens but also what they are, not a relationship they choose (as in volun-
tary association) but an attachment they discover, not merely an
attribute but a constituent of their identity."''1 Sandel's conception
Id.; see also SANDEL, supra note 61, at 294 (noting that contemporary liberalism is helpless in
the face of modern circumstances which are "eroding those forms of community-families
and neighborhoods, cities and towns, civic and ethnic and religious communities-that
situate people in the world and provide a source of identity and belonging").
165 See SANDE:L, supra note 67, at 179.
166 Id.
167 SANDEL, supra note 61, at 13 (emphasis added).
168 Sandel, however, mentions "trade unions and social movements" as examples of
communities that can play an important role in the promotion and attainment of civic
virtue. Id. at 348. This admission is a positive step because these are communities of
choice, but Sandel does not adequately explain what kinds of social movements he has in
mind, or how such movements might be different from the other given communities that
he discusses. He praises the social movement that he does discuss, i.e., the civil rights move-
ment, mostly because that movement was able to make a connection to a particular form of
given community, namely, African-American churches. See supra notes 131-33 and accom-
panying text. As for trade unions, their fit within Sandel's theory of civic republicanism is
not clear because unions, as Sandel recognizes, have been primarily concerned with help-
ing their members bargain and negotiate freely within an individualist, liberal framework,
rather than with instilling in their members the form of civic virtue that Sandel considers
vital in a democracy. See SANDEL, supra note 61, at 198-200.
169 See SANDEL, supra note 67, at 150.
170 See id
171 Id.
Michael Walzer has explained the communitarian position on this issue as follows:
[I]t is a mistake, and a characterically [sic] liberal mistake, to think that the
existing patterns of association are entirely or even largely voluntary and
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of communities is not simply about shared goals (the object), but is
also about common "mode [s] of self-understanding" (the subject).172
Once one comprehends the types of communities that Sandel
does and does not value, one could conclude that he would not be
interested in the types of communities that gay men and lesbians have
formed through voluntary acts. He would likely characterize those
communities as being primarily concerned with the attainment of in-
strumental ends and the pursuit of certain life goals.173 Ultimately,
Sandel does not want to emphasize communities of choice because
choice suggests voluntariness, voluntariness suggests autonomy, and
autonomy takes us right back to liberalism.
For gay men and lesbians, however, communities of choice pro-
vide a sense of freedom and dignity. Gay men and lesbians often join
communities of choice after rejection by communities, such as biolog-
ical families and churches, into which they were born. 17 4 As Kath
Weston eloquently explains, many gay men and lesbians have exper-
ienced the process of choosing and creating new family and kinship ties
that may include close friends, current and former lovers, adopted
children, and children from previous heterosexual relationships,
among others. 175 Gay families are not predetermined and are thus
not constitutive of a certain form of decreed identity. Instead, they
contractual, that is, the product of will alone. In a liberal society, as in every
other society, people are born into very important sorts of groups, born
with identities, male or female, for example, working class, Catholic orJew-
ish, black, democrat, and so on. Many of their subsequent associations...
merely express these underlying identities, which, again, are not so much
chosen as enacted.
Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 15 (1990)
(footnote omitted); see also Buchanan, supra note 5, at 874 (noting communitarian Charles
Taylor's approval of "Hegel's view... that those perceived obligations that are features of
the social relations that constitute our community are valid in a way that voluntarily as-
sumed obligations are not, because the former, unlike the latter, are objectified," that is,
they "provid[e] an 'external standard' for choice" (citing Charles Taylor, Hege" History and
Politics, in LiBEALiSM AND ITs Crrics, supra note 1, at 177, 184)).
172 SANDEL, supra note 67, at 150.
173 Sandel emphasizes the importance that
community describe [society's] basic structure and not merely the disposi-
tions of persons within the structure. For a society to be a community in
this strong sense, community must be constitutive of the shared self-under-
standings of the participants and embodied in their institutional arrange-
ments, not simply an attribute of certain of the participants' plans of life.
Id. at 173.
174 See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text; see also NARDi, supra note 146, at 192
("Because gays and lesbians tend to grow up outside of and sometimes fearing the very
identity group they later become part of, they must create their own communities of
belongingness .... ") .
175 See WsroN, supra note 143, at 3; see also ESrERBERG, supra note 143, at 53 ("The
meanings of lesbian and bisexual identity are shaped by the social and historical contexts
in which lesbians and bisexuals construct their lives and their identities." (emphasis
added)).
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are "[o]rganized through ideologies of love, choice, and creation."176
Thus, by their very nature gay families are more fluid and accommo-
dating than biological families: "In families we choose, the agency
conveyed by 'we' emphasizes each person's part in constructing gay
families, just as the absence of agency in the term 'biological family'
reinforces the sense of blood as an immutable fact over which individ-
uals exert little control."'1 77 This homosexual vision of family, then,
recognizes the important value of family as a community, but places
the responsibility on individuals to decide their own family's rules, ob-
ligations, and dynamics. "By opening the door to the creation of fami-
lies different in kind and composition, choice assign[s] kinship to the
realm of free will and inclination. In the tradition of Thoreau's
Walden, each gay man and lesbian bec[o]me[s] responsible for the
exemplary act of creating an ideal environment."178
Thus, the key for gay men and lesbians is not simply to find and
maintain communities, but to do so as a matter of choice.
Networks of friendships, often reconceptualized as kinships of
choice, become the source for developing communities of identity
and equality. Unlike being born into a community of kin, an indi-
vidual can choose a community of identity that provides norms and
relationships that "stimulate and develop her identity and self-un-
derstanding more adequately than her unchosen community of ori-
gin, her original community of place."179
Furthermore, as some feminists have pointed out, reliance on
and glorification of given communities that are constitutive of iden-
tity, as proposed by Sandel and other communitarians such as Alasdair
Maclntyre, is problematic. 80 While Sandel speaks of the virtues of
176 WESTON, supra note 143, at 27.
177 Id. at 38.
Viewing the gay and lesbian community as unitary or monolithic is an error. Many
different subcommunities exist within the larger gay and lesbian community, and they
often contain divisions along gender, class, race, and ideological lines. See ESrERBERG,
supra note 143, at 114-19; NARDI, supra note 146, at 192-93; WESTON, supra note 143, at 122-
36. For the purposes of this Article, the important point is that the free choices of gay and
lesbian individuals create these narrower, and sometimes conflicting, subcommunities.
178 WESTON, supra note 143, at 110. Blasius describes the creation of a gay and lesbian
ethos as
the consequence of coming out-understood as the process of entering
into and creating oneself through the field of relationships that constitutes
the lesbian and gay community. From this process of self-creation arise
freely chosen responsibilities, conceptions of what is proper and fitting, that
get constituted as selfhood, as what it means to be lesbian and gay.
Blasius, supra note 144, at 658.
179 NARDI, supra note 146, at 192 (quoting MARILYN FRIEDMAN, WHAT ARE FRiENDs FORi?
FEMINIST PERSPEcvES ON PERSONAL RELrATIONSHIPS AND MORAL THEORY 252 (1993)).
180 See Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community, in
FEMINISM AND CommuNm 187 (Penny A. Weiss & Marilyn Friedman eds., 1995) (noting the
limitations of communitarianism from a feminist perspective); see also EuzABETH FRAZER &
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school, family, church, and neighborhood for inculcating in individu-
als a sense of citizenship, he is disappointingly silent about the nega-
tive social forces, such as racism, sexism, and homophobia, which
sometimes emanate from those very same communities. 18' Sandel's
analysis of the positive values that undoubtedly inhere in the commu-
nities he emphasizes is incomplete without a corresponding discus-
sion of the negative values, which, at least in American history, have
been part of those communities. Any discussion of the family without
reference to its traditional patriarchal structure, for example, or of
neighborhoods without acknowledging the long history of dejure and
de facto housing discrimination on the basis of race, provides a one-
sided view of the influences of community in American politics and in
the formation of individual character and identity.'8 2
In fact, commentators have linked discrimination against gay
men and lesbians with the very communities that Sandel believes can
(1) help individuals in the constitutive process of identity formation
and (2) revitalize American democracy. For example, gay men and
lesbians face ostracization by their own biological families to a greater
extent than just about any other group in America-including, proba-
NIcoiA LACEY, THE POLTICS OF COMmImTY A FEMuNIsr CRMQUE OF THE LIBERAL-COMMU-
NITARIAN DEBATE 140 (1993) ("The mere switch of focus from individual to collective values
and public goods does not guarantee progress towards the ending of women's
subordination.").
181 Friedman's critique of communitarianism identified this shortcoming-
Communitarians invoke a model of community that is focused particularly
on families, neighborhoods, and nations. These sorts of communities have
harbored numerous social roles and structures that lead to the subordina-
tion of women, as much recent research has shown. Communitarians, how-
ever, seem oblivious to those difficulties and manifest a troubling
complacency about the moral authority claimed or presupposed by those
communities in regard to their members. By building on uncritical refer-
ences to those sorts of communities, communitarian philosophy can lead in
directions feminists should not wish to follow.
Friedman, supra note 180, at 277; see also Penny A. Weiss, Feminism and Communitarianism:
Comparing Critiques of Liberalism, in FEMINISM AND CoMMuNrry, supra note 180, at 161, 166
("Such forces as sexism and homophobia... not only often create distinct communities
... but also establish relations that pervade and structure all communities, including ones
that seem to have nothing to do with gender, race, sexuality, or class."). Frazer and Lacey
note that
[i]f the basic communitarian claim is that moral and political argument is
validated within particular cultural discourses and practices, whose role in
constructing human identity must be recognised, it is difficult to see how
one is to attain the critical capacity to judge the sexism, patriarchy or any
other feature of the culture in question.
FRAZER & LAcmr, supra note 180, at 141.
182 See Mary Lyndon Shanley, Liberalism and the Future of Democracy, 49 STAN. L. REv.
1271, 1290 (1997) (book review). According to Shanley, "[t]he story that Sandel tells is
suffused with a nostalgia that distorts the historical record by ignoring instances in which
appeals to community values would have deprived members of minority groups of a polit-
ical voice; it is a story that glides over and obscures oppression." Id.
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bly, criminals. 183 While some other minorities have their families as
sources of comfort and protection against the larger and often hostile
society, many gay men and lesbians lack familial support; their fami-
lies often reject them or place them in the excruciatingly difficult po-
sition of having to choose between a relationship with their biological
families and an honest, open life. Many African-American churches
provide a second example: the same communities that Sandel points
to as bastions of participatory democracy and civic virtue and that
were intimately connected with the civil rights movement 84 have
often turned their backs on their gay parishioners who are HIV
positive. 185
The problem, as Christopher Berry argues, is that a person has no
guarantee that communities that are constitutive of a set identity will
be democratic or protective of individual autonomy. 86 Voluntarily
created communities whose membership rules and obligations are
subject to negotiation and bargaining will be more likely to recognize
"the possibility of disagreement and the contingent character of com-
promise."'1 87 The same cannot be said for Sandel's constitutive com-
munities, where the process of forming the appropriate identity
through family, church, and nation is in place long before the individ-
ual joins or, more often, is born into the communities. These given
communities have often failed to promote tolerance and respect for
individuals whom the community members view as having ideas, pref-
erences, and values that undermine the communities' constitutive
elements.'88
183 See WESTON, supra note 143, at 61. Weston reports that when some of the gay men
and lesbians whom she interviewed came out to their parents, they were, for example,
"institutionalized, threatened with electroshock therapy, kicked out of the house, reduced
to living on the street, denied an inheritance, written out of a will, battered, damned as a
sinner, barred from contact with younger relatives, shunned by family members, or in-
suited in ways that encouraged [them] to leave." Id.
184 See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
185 See Reginald Glenn Blaxton, Yeus Wept: Black Churches and MV, HARv. GAY & LES-
BIAN REV., Winter 1998, at 13; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Eyes Shut, Black America Is Being Ravaged
by AlIS, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1998, at Al.
186 See Berry, supra note 4, at 79.
187 Id. at 78.
188 I do not mean to suggest that communities of choice are inured from intolerant
tendencies. In fact I do not want to idealize gay and lesbian communities in the same way
that Sandel idealizes given communities. As Susan Krieger has demonstrated, in the con-
text of discussing lesbian communities (and the same could apply to gay male communi-
ties), these communities sometimes "threaten as well as affirm individual identity." Susan
Krieger, Lesbian Identity and Community: Recent Social Science LiteraturN SIGNS, Autumn 1982,
at 91, reprinted in THE LESBIAN ISSUE: ESSAYS FROM SIGNS 223 (Estelle B. Freedman et al. eds.,
1985). Gay and lesbian communities, like all communities, sometimes trample on individ-
ual choices and priorities in order to maintain a sense of stability and cohesion. As Krieger
notes (again, in the context of lesbian communities), "[t]he problems posed by lesbian
communities are similar to those found in many other social groups and especially in mi-
nority groups, where efforts to achieve group solidarity and cohesiveness often conflict
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In the face of rejection and disapproval from the communities
that Sandel and other communitarians consider to be constitutive of
identity, gay men and lesbians have created their own communities.
For some gay men and lesbians, these communities have completely
replaced the more traditional communities from which they came.
But for most the situation is more complex because they often retain
links and attachments to their given communities while simultane-
ously becoming deeply embedded into the communities they create
around sexuality, love, and friendship. 189 This complex struggle of
multiple commitments and multiple sources of identity exposes the
simplicity in Sandel's effort to prioritize traditional, nonvoluntary
communities.19° Ultimately, a discussion about the value of commu-
nity is incomplete if it does not consider the role of communities of
choice in the promotion of human flourishing and freedom. Gay
men and lesbians, at least, have shown how their communities of
choice can provide a source of comfort, a sense of belonging, a degree
of personal freedom, and a measure of dignity. If liberals are in fact
too limited in their assessment of the good that communities can
sometimes contribute to the freedom and well-being of individuals,
then Sandel's vision is similarly limited because he ignores the value
of communities of choice.
with efforts to foster individuality and to tolerate internal deviance." Id.; see also ESTERzERG,
supra note 143, at 114 (reporting that lesbian and bisexual women in a small, northeastern
town found that "[w] omen described the [lesbian] community as close yet closed, cohesive
yet claustrophobic").
Despite the tendency of communities of all kinds to prioritize cohesiveness over indi-
viduality, those communities created through the voluntary acts of their members contain
greater room for flexibility, disagreement, and dialogue. See supra notes 174-79, 187 and
accompanying text; see also Friedman, supra note 180, at 199-204 (noting that friendships
and communities of urban dwellers, which are communities of choice, are less likely to be
oppressive than the traditional communities emphasized by communitarians).
189 See Friedman, supra note 180, at 194-99.
190 Friedman illustrates this by asserting that "[t]he problem is not simply to appreci-
ate community per se but rather to reconcile the conflicting claims, demands, and identity-
defining influences of the variety of communities of which one is a part." Id. at 194. In
making a similar argument, Michael Walzer has criticized Sandel for not considering that
Americans often choose cultural and religious encumbrances. See Michael Walzer, Michael
Sandel's America, in DEBATING DImoca cy's DiscoNTT 175, 178 (Anita L. Allen & Milton
C. Regan,Jr. eds., 1998). In Walzer's example, an American Jew often chooses the encum-
brances she faces, while the Jewish orthodoxy in Eastern Europe essentially provides en-
cumbrances on its people. See id. Thus, in immigrant societies such as the United States,
individuals can and often must choose among "many possible identifications." Id.
While Sandel does acknowledge that individuals can be subject to "multiple loyalties"
of "sometimes conflicting obligations," SAl-IEL, supra note 61, at 350, those loyalties and
obligations, in order to be valuable and meaningful from the perspective of civic republi-
canism, must be given rather than chosen, see supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text.
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2. Moral Bracketing in Constitutional Interpretation
As I have argued elsewhere, Sandel's critique of the liberal tenet
of moral bracketing, which seeks to separate moral values from polit-
ical discourse, is compelling. 191 When gay men and lesbians partici-
pate in the public discourse about gay rights, they generally avoid
arguments relating to morality; instead, they mostly emphasize tradi-
tional liberal, neutral values such as privacy, toleration, and equal-
ity.192 Meaningful political discussions about topics such as same-sex
marriages and gay and lesbian families, however, are not possible with-
out fully engaging the normative issues involved.193 Sandel is there-
fore correct when he argues that political debates about controversial
issues such as homosexuality must address normative and moral is-
sues. At the very least, Sandel's arguments relating to the drawbacks
of moral bracketing force gay men and lesbians to question the true
benefits of this almost instinctive method of coping with their oppo-
nents' normative concerns.
Sandel, however, wants the moral brackets removed not only as a
matter of political discourse, but also as a matter of constitutional in-
terpretation. 194 This proposal is problematic from a gay rights per-
spective because it falls to consider sufficiently the institutional role of
courts. In fact, Sandel does not appear to fully appreciate the role
that constitutional adjudication plays in protecting the interests and
rights of minorities from the will and biases of majorities.' 95
As a result of Sandel's failure to address the negative social forces
that have influenced the constitutive components of the communities
that he seeks to promote, 196 he predictably overlooks the type of insti-
tutional framework that is necessary to mitigate the impact that these
social forces have on marginalized minority groups. For example, as
previously mentioned, Sandel contends that the civil rights movement
of the 1950s and 1960s was fundamentally a communitarian move-
ment because it found its energy and voice in southern African-Ameri-
can churches.197 While black churches undoubtedly played a vital
role in this activism, the movement could not have attained its goals
without a federal judiciary that was generally willing to enforce liberal
191 See Ball, supra note 36, at 1893-94.
192 See id. at 1872-75.
193 See id. at 1901-02; Carlos A. Ball &Janice Farrell Pea, Waning with Wardle: Morality,
Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. iL. L. REv. 253, 267-70; Feldblum, supra
note 50; supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
194 See supra notes 99-119 and accompanying text.
195 Cf Mark Tushnet, A Public Philosophy for the Professional-Managerial Class, 106 YALE
L.J. 1571, 1581 (1997) (book review) (noting that Sandel "sometimes disregards institu-
tional... reasons for adopting" certain constitutional rules).
196 See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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rights, such as equality under the law, against the will of the majority
white community.198 The federal judiciary had a critical institutional
role to play in protecting the interests of the African-American minor-
ity in the racist-dominated political atmosphere of the American
South.
Sandel does not contend that the role of the federal judiciary in
the civil rights struggle was appropriate because it acted as a buffer to
the will of the majority, a view that would support the liberal concep-
tion of constitutional rights acting as trumps against majoritarian
goals. 19 9 Rather, he asserts that the judicial reaction was appropriate
because "the nature of the cause" that the civil rights movement ad-
vanced was correct.200 Asking judges to assess "the nature of the
cause" in order to determine the scope and applicability of constitu-
tional rights, however, reduces the constitutional adjudicative process
to an essentially political one. Under Sandel's model, judges would
decide the scope and applicability of constitutional provisions by en-
gaging in the same normative assessments that citizens and their legis-
lative representatives perform when participating in the political
process. Thus, the judges would sit as "super-legislators"; their evalua-
tions of the "nature of the cause" would carry constitutional imprima-
turs of approval. 201
From a gay rights perspective, this high degree of deference to
judicial discretion on issues of morality, without any real constraints
on the need to protect individuals from the practical consequences of
198 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
199 See DWORKIN, supra note 13, at xv.
200 SANDEL, supra note 61, at 90.
201 As Professors Fleming and McClain point out,
Sandel does not explicitly endorse the traditional republican view [that ju-
dicial review debilitates the democratic process]. Indeed, his call for moral
argument in constitutional law may be anathema to it. For that view entails
minimal judicial intervention into politics, especially where questions of
morality, virtue, and the like are concerned, whereas his argument entails
greater judicial intervention in the sense that courts would weigh in on
rather than bracket controversial moral and political issues.
James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, In Search of a Substantive Republi, 76 TE. L. REv.
509, 523 (1997) (book review).
Sandel's call for expanding the role that morality and notions of the good should play
in constitutional adjudication is arguably similar to Ronald Dworkin's call for a moral inter-
pretation of the Constitution. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING
OF THE AMERicAN CONsTrrtrrION 2 (1996). Dworkin's approach, however, is different be-
cause he retains the liberal principles of autonomy, equality, and privacy as the normative
guideposts in constitutional adjudication. See id. at 7-18, 21-29. According to Sandel,
Dworkin's approach does not permit a sufficiently deep discussion (i.e., one that goes be-
yond liberal values) of the normative disputes at issue. See Fleming & McClain, supra, at
526 (arguing that Sandel claims that " 'minimalist liberalism' like Dworkin's... attempts to
stay on the surface, philosophically speaking, [and] is [therefore] too shallow to attain
agreement upon the justification for and the scope of constitutional rights such as intimate
association and reproductive freedom").
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judges' substantive moral evaluations, is troubling. Little evidence
exists to suggest that judges as a group are any less likely than elected
politicians to perceive gay and lesbian relationships and intimacies as
lacking in normative value.
It is telling, in this regard, that while Sandel is extremely critical
of the dissenting opinions in Bowers v. Hardwick202 because they relied
too heavily on issues of autonomy and choice,203 he does not assess
Justice White's majority opinion or Chief Justice Burger's concurring
opinion. Justice White argued in Bowers that "the presumed belief of a
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is im-
moral and unacceptable" is not an "inadequate rationale to support
[the criminalization of such sodomy]. '' 204 Justice Burger employed
'Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards" to question the moral-
ity of homosexuals.20 5 Sandel's silence regarding these two opinions
is instructive because the Court, and Justice Burger in particular,
adopted the model that Sandel advocates: They removed the moral
brackets in constitutional decision making.
Presumably Sandel could criticize Burger's moral reasoning, but
such a discussion would entail a comprehensive critique of how
Burger's interpretation of the Judeo-Christian tradition did not
actually support Burger's position in Bowers. Sandel, however, de-
votes little time to addressing substantive moral discourse. Ironically,
after all his criticism of the procedural liberal republic, Sandel's
theory of constitutional interpretation is similarly procedural: It
advocates the removal of moral brackets in constitutional adjudi-
cation involving gay men and lesbians, but does not explain what to
do, other than to draw an analogy between homosexual intimacy
and heterosexual commitment, 20 6 once those brackets are re-
202 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
203 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
204 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
205 Id. (Burger, GJ., concurring). Justice Burger argued that "[t]o hold that the act of
homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside
millennia of moral teaching." Id. at 197 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
206 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. The issue in Bowers was whether the
state could criminalize sexual conduct between two men, regardless of their level of com-
mitment to each other. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. In the context of Bowers, a logical
conclusion from Sandel's argument that seeks to link homosexual intimacy with heterosex-
ual marriage is that the state can criminalize sodomy when two consenting strangers en-
gage in it, but not when it involves two individuals in a committed relationship. Obviously,
a determination of the scope and applicability of the right to privacy based solely, or even
primarily, on an analogy between homosexual conduct and committed heterosexual rela-
tionships is problematic. Many homosexuals (and many heterosexuals) are not interested
in having commitment accompany their sexual acts, yet that should not be the dispositive
criterion in determining whether the state has the authority to interfere with an individ-
ual's autonomy and privacy. For a powerful critique of the repercussions of Sandel's defi-
nition of privacy in the context of gay rights, see BONNIE HONG, PoLrrcAL THEORY AND
THE DispiACEMENT OF PoLrrcs 186-95 (1993); see also Fleming & McClain, supra note 201,
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moved.20 7 As a matter of process, then, Justice Burger and Sandel
might agree that incorporating the Judeo-Christian tradition into an
assessment of the scope of the constitutional right to privacy is not
improper, even if they would ultimately disagree on the result of such
an incorporation.
Sandel does not explain how the moral vision that he does pro-
mote, which calls for the government to advance the goods of greater
civic participation and virtue in American society, would help
marginalized minorities attain equality and acceptance. Greater par-
ticipation in democratic institutions and an increased sense of civic
virtue are rather empty normative vessels as they apply to the status of
gay men and lesbians in society.208 Sandel, like other civic republi-
cans, is overly optimistic about the benefits that can accrue from
greater civic participation and dialogue. This over-optimism is espe-
cially evident with respect to minorities: Even if gay men and lesbians
engage in an open and ongoing process of civic dialogue, if history is
any guide, society is likely to exclude them from the distribution of
many of the social goods when the dialogue ends and government
enforces the decisions reached.20 9 A theory of political morality, as
well as a normative vision of the Constitution, that aims to protect
individual autonomy, free choice, and the ability of individuals to
guide their own destiny provides much better protection for the inter-
ests of gay men and lesbians than Sandel's vision of a government
purposefully promoting civic virtue and of judges parceling through
issues of morality.
Identifying the limits of civic participation and dialogue, how-
ever, does not mean that autonomy and free choice are the only nor-
mative values important in constitutional adjudication involving gay
men and lesbians. As Professors Fleming and McClain point out,
at 536 ("[Sandel's] appeal to analogy is... inherently conservative because ... [p]ersons
who cannot show the sameness of the goods of their relationship to those of... a tradition-
ally protected relationship fail to secure protection.").
207 See Fleming & McClain, supra note 201, at 521 ("[Sandel] does not offer a substan-
tive account of goods or virtues or ends so much as a call for a republican form of argu-
ment or justification for constitutional freedoms, and a commitment to a process of
deliberation.").
208 William Connolly suggests the possibility of making a civic case for the need "to
appreciate multiple alternatives to univocal ideals of sexual relations and household organ-
ization." William E. Connolly, Civic Republicanism and Civic Pluralism: The Silent Struggle of
Michael Sande4 in DEBATING DEMOcRAcY's DiscoNTatNr, supra note 190, at 205, 208. Con-
nolly, however, recognizes that such an argument would entail not so much civic republi-
canism as civic pluralism since there are "a variety of patterns through which intimate
relations of dignity might be established." Id. The existence of pluralism, then, takes soci-
ety away from a predetermined sense of civic virtue and towards the concept that Sandel
wants to de-emphasize, namely, choice.
209 See Gey, supra note 80, at 840 ("[T]he civic republicans do not pursue the implica-
tions of an... important fact of all political processes: at some point the dialogue must
end, a decision must be made, and the community's decisions must be enforced.").
2000] 483
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Sandel ignores those parts of the Bowers dissents that discuss the goods
that arise from autonomy: "A more complete, less selective, reading of
the dissents in Bowers reveals the argument that the protection of
choice is important precisely because of the good of such things as
marriage, family, and intimate association in persons' lives." 210 The
deeper values that Sandel would like judges to keep in mind when
they confront constitutional issues involving gay men and lesbians,
such as the goodness of committed homosexual relationships that
makes them akin to committed heterosexual relationships, 21' ema-
nate from the autonomy that individuals exercise in deciding for
themselves the kinds of relationships that have value for them. Sandel's
disregard for the value of free choice and autonomy assures that his
"republican model artificially separates moral goods from the process
of choosing them."212 A theory of political morality that does not ex-
plicitly recognize the connection between autonomy and choice on
the one hand, and the attainment of freedom and dignity on the
other, has little to offer to gay men and lesbians.
III
MICHAEL WALZER'S THEORY OF JUSTICE
For Michael Walzer, justice inheres in a society's shared tradi-
tions.213 Different societies and cultures have different traditions;
thus, even if the promotion of a particular form ofjustice is appropri-
ate in one society, the same may not be true for others. 214 Walzer
emphasizes the need to distribute social goods according to a society's
definitions of those goods, and not through objective or universal
210 Fleming & McClain, supra note 201, at 530. They note that "[a]sJustice Blackmun
puts it: '[o]nly the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is a
sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family lfe, community welfare, and the
development of human personality.'" 1d. (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun,J., dissent-
ing) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (emphasis added). Mary Lyndon Shanley makes
a similar point in a review of Democracy's Discontent. See Shanley, supra note 182, at 1284.
Justice Blackmun stated in his dissent in Bowers that
the right to define one's identity "cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we
all depend on the 'emotional enrichment from close ties with others.'"
Thus, the dissent in Bowers actually insists that privacy is necessary to foster
interpersonal relationships, and acknowledges the primacy of intimate as-
sociations as the proper object of the privacy protection.
Id. (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)) (citation omitted) (empha-
ses added).
211 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
212 Fleming & McClain, supra note 201, at 531.
While Sandel, when discussing homosexuality, speaks exclusively of substantive due
process and the right to privacy, equality is another important liberal value that provides
some constitutional protection to gay men and lesbians. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
213 See infra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
214 See infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
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standards of justice that are outside of the shared traditions of the
particular society in question.215
Walzer's communitarianism is different from Sandel's in two fun-
damental ways. First, Walzer emphasizes the value of equality-in par-
ticular, what he calls "complex equality"216-while Sandel emphasizes
the values of civic virtue and self-government.2 17 Second, while
Walzer explicitly rejects the relevance of universal principles ofjustice,
Sandel, as Stephen Gardbaum notes, implicitly abides by a form of
universalism.218 Sandel "does not state that the good is whatever your
community values, but rather that the good must be pursued in and
through political community."2 19 Furthermore, Sandel's version of
communitarianism "assert[s] community as a value directly applicable
everywhere. It represents the one true conception of the good life for
human beings."220 On the other hand, Walzer argues that all social
criticism, including assessments of what is just, must be wholly internal
to a society and its norms: "[I]t is only the traditions, cultures, and
values of particular political communities that are relevant to political
argument and knowledge."221
Ultimately, Walzer's theory of justice presents a more optimistic
communitarian vision for gay rights than Sandel's ideas. In particular,
Walzer's insistence on the allocation of social goods according to their
own appropriate distributive criteria offers support for gay rights posi-
tions in the areas of marriage222 and parenting.223 Walzer's vision is
not without its limitations, however, given that a society's shared tradi-
tions can be multiple and conflicting. Currently, this situation con-
fronts the American society as it debates whether the meaning of
marriage can include the union of two individuals of the same
gender.22 4
215 See infra notes 225-34 and accompanying text.
216 See infra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 80, 122-23 and accompanying text.
218 See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 685, 697 (1992).
219 Id.
220 Id. at 700. Gardbaum believes that this is true not only of Sandel, but also of Alas-
dair MacIntyre and Hannah Arendt. See id. at 697, 700.
221 Id. at 696. In this sense, those whom Gardbaum labels strong communitarians,
such as Sandel, share a faith in universalist principles, even though universalism usually
calls to mind liberals like Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin, for his part, accuses Waizer of being
relativistic. See infra notes 259-65 and accompanying text.
222 See infra Part III.B.1.
223 See infra Part III.B.2.
224 See infra notes 299-323 and accompanying text.
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A. Spheres of Justice and Complex Equality
The starting place for Michael Walzer's theory of justice is the
shared traditions through which particular societies give meaning and
value to social goods.225 "Goods in the world," he explains, "have
shared meanings because conception and creation are social
processes. For the same reason, goods have different meanings in dif-
ferent societies."226
Walzer finds particular interest in how a society's shared tradi-
tions call for the distribution of different social goods.2 27 The distrib-
utive criteria that society employs to allocate its goods, like the goods
themselves, are dependent on social meanings and traditions.228 As a
result, the justness of those distributions is "relative to the social mean-
ings of the goods at stake." 229 Given that justice arises from "social
meanings," an inherent fluidity and changeability exists in what soci-
ety considers to be just or unjust: "Social meanings are historical in
character; and so distributions, and just and unjust distributions,
change over time."230
Because different societies have different ways of distributing so-
cial goods, the assessment of the justness of distributive practices must
be internal to a society. Thus, shared meanings and traditions be-
come the standard of measurement for distributive practices. In this
context, the analysis that Walzer "propose[s] is imminent and phe-
nomenological in character. It will yield not an ideal map or a master
plan but, rather, a map and a plan appropriate to the people for
whom it is drawn, whose common life it reflects." 23 '
225 See WALzF_, supra note 34, at 7. Walzer is only interested in goods that have social
value. See id. Those goods that are "idiosyncratically valued" are not relevant to his theory
ofjustice. Id. Walzer raises the possibility that all goods are in fact social, because if they
did not have some form of social value, they would not be goods, but he purposefully
"leave[s that] question open." Id
226 Id,
227 See id. at 6-10.
228 See id. at 8-9.
229 Id. at 9.
230 Id. The liberal instinct is to reject a theory ofjustice that makes justice dependent
on the norms of a particular culture, time, or place. See, e.g., THoMAs NAGEL, THE LAsT
WoRD 101-25 (1997); Ronald Dworkin, Objectivily and Truth: You'd Better Believe I 25 PH.
& PuB. A. 87, 89 (1996). For a discussion of this liberal critique of Walzer, see infra notes
256-58 and accompanying text.
231 WALZER, supra note 34, at 26.
Walzer's brand of philosophy, which focuses on current distributive patterns and
shared traditions, can garner criticism for placing too much emphasis on what "is," rather
than on what "ought to be." This philosophical approach can arguably create a rather
sterile and positivistic theory of morality. Walzer responds to this criticism by noting that
"the most interesting parts of the moral world are only in principle factual matters; in
practice [moral facts] have to be 'read,' rendered, construed, glossed, elucidated, and not
merely described." ICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SocIAL CRmcIsM 29 (1987).
The interpretation of shared traditions entails more than simply studying empirical behav-
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Walzer rejects the notion that universal principles exist which can
tell people whether a particular distributive pattern is objectively un-
just.232 He also disapproves of the view of the political philosopher as
one isolated from the rest of society in an ivory tower thinking about
the a priori conditions that are necessary for the creation of a just
society. Instead, Walzer views the political philosopher as historian,233
anthropologist, and sociologist, immersing herself in the process of
understanding and evaluating the shared traditions and meanings of a
particular society.23 4
Because different social goods within different societies have dif-
ferent distributive criteria, Walzer believes that the key to justice is to
ensure that those criteria (1) remain consistent with the shared tradi-
tions of their society and (2) remain within their respective spheres.2 35
As Walzer explains,
ioral patterns because those traditions "are frequently expressed in general concepts-in
its historical ideals, its public rhetoric, its foundational texts, its ceremonies and rituals."
Id. Moral interpretation "will sometimes confirm and sometimes challenge received opin-
ion. And if we disagree with either the confirmation or the challenge, there is nothing to
do but go back to the 'text'-the values, principles, codes, and conventions that constitute
the moral world-and to the 'readers' of the text." Id. at 30.
232 See WALZER, supra note 34, at 3-5. Walzer notes that
[i]n a world of particular cultures, competing conceptions of the good,
scarce resources, elusive and expansive needs, there isn't going to be a sin-
gle formula, universally applicable. There isn't going to be a single, univer-
sally approved path that carries us from a notion like, say, "fair shares" to a
comprehensive list of the goods to which that notion applies.
Id. at 79.
233 Walzer has recently praised Sandel's Democracy's Disconten, calling it "a wonderful
example of immanent social criticism" because it is "more historical than philosophical: a
reflection upon experience rather than a reflection upon ideas." Walzer, supra note 190,
at 175.
234 See WA.LZER, supra note 34, at xiv.
WaIzer believes that there are three important-though not necessarily exclusive-
ways of "doing moral philosophy... [:] the path of discovery, the path of invention, and
the path of interpretation." WALZER, supra note 231, at 3. He is critical of the first method
because it requires the philosopher to "step[ ] back in his mind from his social position."
I& at 5. The problem with this approach is that "[m ] ost often, the moral principles here
delivered to us are already in our possession, incorporated, as it were, long ago, familiar
and well-thumbed by now." Id. at 6. The second path, that of invention, is the path of
Descartes, Rawls, and Habermas. See id. at 11. This path emphasizes "methodology" and "a
design procedure" to achieve an end that society considers just. Id. at 10. Thus, people
can create or invent a morality "against which we can measure any person's life, any soci-
ety's practices." Id. at 13. Because Walzer is skeptical of the universal application of these
invented methodologies, he asks: "Why should newly invented principles govern the lives
of people who already share a moral culture and speak a natural language?" Id. at 14.
Thus, Walzer's preferred path of "doing moral philosophy" is the path of interpretation,
which "lends itself less to abstract modeling than to thick description. Moral argument...
is interpretative in character, closely resembling the work of a lawyer or judge who strug-
gles to find meaning in a morass of conflicting laws and precedents." Id. at 20. For further
discussion of Walzer's theory of moral interpretation, see infra notes 266-77 and accompa-
nying text.
235 See WALZE, supra note 34, at 10.
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[e]very social good or set of goods constitutes, as it were, a distribu-
tive sphere within which only certain criteria and arrangements are
appropriate. Money is inappropriate in the sphere of ecclesiastical
office; it is an intrusion from another sphere. And piety should
make for no advantage in the marketplace, as the marketplace has
commonly been understood.23 6
The key to justice, then, is to make sure that the distributive crite-
rion that is appropriate for one sphere does not spill over and domi-
nate other spheres. Walzer argues that most egalitarians concern
themselves with ensuring that no distributive criterion monopolizes
any particular sphere.23 7 However, under Walzer's theory, the focus
of justice should not be on whether a particular distributive criterion
monopolizes a particular sphere, but on whether a distributive crite-
rion dominates outside of its appropriate sphere.23 8 For example, using
money as the criterion that monopolizes the distribution of commodi-
ties in a capitalist society such as the United States may be perfectly
acceptable; this domination is not necessarily unjust if it is consistent
with American shared meanings and traditions.23 9 Rather, injustice
results when the role and influence of money spills over into other
spheres such as social welfare, education, and politics. 2 40
Walzer calls for the recognition of "complex equality": an accept-
ance of distributive monopolies-and thus inequalities-within spe-
cific spheres, but a rejection of the domination by a distributive
criterion outside of its proper sphere.241 As Walzer explains, complex
equality
establishes a set of relationships such that domination is impossible.
In formal terms, complex equality means that no citizen's standing
in one sphere or with regard to one social good can be undercut by
his standing in some other sphere, with regard to some other good.
Thus, citizen X may be chosen over citizen Y for political office, and
then the two of them will be unequal in the sphere of politics. But
they will not be unequal generally so long as X's office gives him no
236 Id.
237 See id. at 12-13.
238 See id. at 17-20.
239 See id. at 103-08.
240 In order to keep wealth and money within the sphere of commodities, society must
implement and enforce "blocked exchanges"-societal norms that place important social
goods beyond the reach of the market. Id. at 100-03. Examples of the goods that should
be beyond the scope of the market include inter alia political power, criminal justice, and
the rights to marriage, procreation, free speech, and assembly. See id.
Brian Barry argues that Walzer's admission that money can be the dominant distribu-
tive criterion within the sphere of commodities, as long as it is consistent with a nation's
shared traditions, makes "Walzer and Hayek... strange bedfellows." Brian Barry, Spherical
Justice and Global Injustice, in PLURASM, JusTICE, AND EQuALITr 67, 71 (David Miller &
Michael WaIzer eds., 1995).
241 See WALZER, supra note 34, at 17-20.
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advantages over Y in any other sphere-superior medical care, ac-
cess to better schools for his children, entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties, and so on.242
Complex equality is different from "simple equality."24 3 Under
the latter paradigm, the same distributive criterion applies across the
spectrum of social goods. 244 For example, Walzer notes that the
maxim "'[t] o each according to his needs,"' may be acceptable-from
an American perspective, given our shared traditions-for govern-
ment services such as welfare, but it is an inappropriate criterion for
the allocation of political power, religion, or marriage.245 According
to Walzer, neither that distributive maxim nor any other should apply
across spheres.246
Some goods exist that the community provides through its gov-
ernment, rather than through, for example, market exchanges.
Walzer argues that the list of goods that a community decides to pro-
vide directly to individuals will depend on the "collective values and
political choices" of that community.247 However, he notes that
[o]nce the community undertakes to provide some needed good, it
must provide it to all the members who need it in proportion to
their needs. The actual distribution ill be limited by the available
resources; but all other criteria, beyond need itself, are experienced
as distortions and not as limitations of the distributive process.2 48
242 Id. at 19.
243 Id. at 18.
244 See id.
245 Id at 25-26.
246 See id. Another example of simple equality is the liberal maxim of "equality of
opportunity"; such a maxim may be appropriate for the distribution ofjobs, but it does not
describe, for example, the way that our government allocates services or our polity chooses
its leaders.
David Miller interprets simple equality as follows:
[Ain idea of equality [is] 'simple' when it holds that equality requires the
equal possession or enjoyment of some advantage X. A society is egalita-
rian, on this view, when all its members are equal in respect of X; that is,
they equally enjoy the stuff or the condition represented by X. There are as
many notions of simple equality as there are plausible contenders for the X
in this formula: candidates include property, income, opportunity, rights,
resources, capacities, and welfare.
David Miller, Complex Equality, in PLURALISM, JUSTICE, AND EQUAITY, supra note 240, at 197,
197. A condition of simple equality can thus exist when everyone has equal shares of a
particular resource. Even in the unlikely event, however, that society can attain such a
point of complete equality (in the absence of a coercive state that continuously and aggres-
sively redistributes the resource), it would not last very long because individuals, through
different interests and abilities, would trade and attempt to monopolize the particular re-
source in question. See WALZER, supra note 34, at 13-17.
247 WALZER, supra note 34, at 74. In Spheres ofJustic, Walzer explains how different
communities, such as ancient Athens, a medieval Jewish community, and contemporary
America, allocate community-provided goods. See id at 69-74, 84-91.
248 Id. at 75.
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Walzer's main contemporary example of a community-distributed
good is medical care.249 In the United States, the state provides
health care through subsidies for some individuals and most hospitals.
Walzer argues that once the state, at the request of its citizens, partici-
pates in the provision of health care, it must allocate that good accord-
ing to need and not wealth.250 However, in the United States,
no political decision has yet been made to challenge directly the
system of free enterprise in medical care. And so long as that sys-
tem exists, wealth will be dominant in (this part of) the sphere of
security and welfare; individuals will be cared for in proportion to
their ability to pay and not to their need for care.251
According to Walzer, this pattern of distribution for health care is un-
just because it does not fully abide by the distributive principle of
need that the United States accepts for services that the community
provides directly.252
The fact that Walzer's theory does not prioritize any specific
sphere, or any specific distributive criterion, over others is important.
No spheres are ex ante more valuable than others in the same way
that no principle of justice, such as Rawls's difference principle,2 53
Raz's normative good of autonomy, 254 or Sandel's civic republican-
ism, 255 cuts across spheres.
Thus, the differences between Walzer's theory of justice and lib-
eralism are easy to identify. Instead of considering individual auton-
omy-a universal principle that cuts across spheres and societies-as
the cornerstone of justice, Walzer focuses on social goods and how
particular societies distribute them. While Walzer believes that the
protection of human liberty is vital for the creation of ajust society, he
also believes that the best way to protect that liberty is not through the
enforcement of an a priori list of individual rights, but by abiding by
the internal traditions through which communities distribute goods.
Because of this difference, liberals have rejected Walzer's ideas.
The principal liberal critique of Walzer's brand of communitarianism
is that the internal criticism, which Walzer argues is central to the eval-
uative process ofjustice, is dangerously optimistic about the existence
of shared traditions and relativistic about assessments ofjustice within
the differing internal traditions. For example, Ronald Dworkin con-
249 See id. at 86-91.
250 See id. at 88-89. Wealth would be the appropriate distributive criterion to employ
when allocating those commodities that the government chooses not to provide. See id. at
89.
251 Id. at 89.
252 See id at 86-91.
253 See RAWLs, supra note 38, at 75-80.
254 SeeJosEPH RAz, THE MORAL=n OF FREEDOM 369-99 (1986).
255 See supra Part II.A.
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tends that "[o]ur political arguments almost never begin in some
shared understanding of the pertinent principles of distribution.
Every important issue is a contest between competing models."25 6
Specifically, Dworkin questions whether in the United States a shared
understanding exists regarding how to allocate medical care, and, if
one does exist, whether that shared understanding is compatible with
Walzer's interpretation of the understanding: 257
Why is the argument defending the status quo in medical care [in
the United States]-that the balance between market and need that
politics has achieved itself provides the best interpretation of its
moral traditions with respect to medicine-any worse than the argu-
ment for reform in either direction? IfWalzer says that the compro-
mise is a poorer interpretation because it is unprincipled, because it
does not express a coherent and defensible vision ofjustice, then he
is appealing to the idea of abstract justice he rejects; if he says it is
illegitimate because it does not consistently enforce either the mar-
ket or the need model then he is appealing to preordained
spheres. 258
256 Ronald Dworkin & Michael Walzer, To Each His Own: An Exchange on Spheres ofJus-
tice; in CoMMuNTAAmsM: A Naw PUBOIC ETHics, supra note 1, at 110, 112. Brian Barry
provides a similar criticism of Walzer: "We are heirs of many traditions, religious and secu-
lar, which cannot without gross self-deception be presented as forming a harmonious
whole. Any critic must therefore pick and choose among the available materials, simply
because there is no way of reconciling them." Brian Barry, Social Citicism and Political Phi-
losophy, 19 PHnL. & PuB. Arr. 360, 370 (1990).
257 For an illustration of how Walzer's interpretation of this understanding excludes
market factors from the allocation of health care and relies solely on need as the appropri-
ate distributive criterion, see supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
258 Dworkin & Walzer, supra note 256, at 119. Michael Rustin expresses a similar
criticism:
Whereas it does follow from the existence of a sphere of health, and a
sphere of market exchange, that there is a boundary to be negotiated be-
tween them .... there seems no consensual reason for drawing this bound-
ary at the point of providing for a universal rather than residual health-care
system. [American] [c]itizens seem to be committed both to a view of
health as an intrinsic good, and to a conception of property rights which
makes health care a legitimate object of purchase.
Michael Rustin, Equality in Post-Modern Times, in PLURALISM, JusTicE, AND EQUALrrY, supra
note 240, at 17, 34-35.
Another possible criticism of Walzer's theory ofjustice is that, despite his protestations
to the contrary, the theory relies on some universal principles. See Neera K. Badhwar,
Moral Agency, Commitment, and Impartiality, in THE CoMMuNarARLT CHALLENGE TO LIBER-
AuSM, supra note 1, at 1, 8 (noting that Walzer "explicitly affirm[s] universal rights to life
and liberty as based on 'our common humanity'" (quoting inter alia WALZER, supra note
34, at xv)). Similarly, one can view the rule that spillover effects from one sphere to an-
other always lead to injustice, as a form of metaprinciple from which no departure is possi-
ble without violating Walzer's theory of justice. In fact, part of Dworkin's critique is that
some societies may exist for which a comingling of the spheres constitutes their shared
tradition. Walzer does seem to reject ex ante such comingling. See supra notes 235-52 and
accompanying text.
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According to Dworkin, the problem with Walzer's theory of jus-
tice is not only that no shared tradition within a political community is
usually deep enough to resolve most of the controversial policy dis-
agreements within that community, but also that Walzer's theory has
within it a "deep relativism."259 As discussed above, Walzer believes
that the process of social criticism and moral interpretation is wholly
internal to a society.2 60 Thus, Walzer argues, in a heavily criticized
example,261 that outsiders may incorrectly make automatic conclu-
sions that the hierarchical caste system of India is unjust because Indi-
ans may believe in its distributive principles. 262 Dworkin argues that
Walzer's view, which rejects universal principles ofjustice, ignores the
fact that 'justice is our critic not our mirror."263 If one shared under-
standing within our political tradition exists for Dworkin, it is that in-
dividuals can always use principles ofjustice to question even the most
established traditions. 264 Thus, he suggests that 'valzer's relativism is
259 Dworkin & Walzer, supra note 256, at 112-13.
260 See supra notes 225-40 and accompanying text.
261 See, e.g., Badwhar, supra note 258, at 10; Barry, supra note 240, at 75. Dworkin
states:
[Walzer] says, for example, that a caste system is just in a society whose
traditions accept it, and that it would be unjust, in such a society, to dis-
tribute goods and other resources equally. But his remarks about whatjus-
tice requires in a society whose members disagree about justice are simply
mysterious.
Dworkin & Walzer, supra note 256, at 112-13; see also Rustin, supra note 258, at 31 ("[I]t is
surely unreasonable to assign ... overwhelming weight in deciding questions ofjustice and
injustice to internal states of (real or apparent) consensus when these may depend so
largely on force or ignorance.")
262 See WALZER, supra note 34, at 313-14.
263 Dworkin & Walzer, supra note 256, at 114.
264 See id. Dworkin states that "our common political life [holds) that any decision
about the distribution of any good-wealth, welfare, honors, education, recognition, of-
fice-may be reopened no matter how firm the traditions that are then challenged." Id.
In his discussion of the Indian caste system, Walzer argues that it would be appropriate
for a visitor to an Indian village to attempt to convince the residents, "for example, that
men and women are created equal not across many incarnations but within the compass of
this one." WALZER, supra note 34, at 314. Walzer also acknowledges that attempts to criti-
cize the caste system from inside would be appropriate if there was anger and indignation
within the village community about the hierarchical distributive principles of the Indian
caste system:
If that were so, then it would be important to seek out the principles that
shaped their anger and indignation. These principles, too, must have their
part in villagejustice .... Social meanings need not be harmonious; some-
times they provide only the intellectual structure within which distributions
are debated. But that is a necessary structure. There are no external or
universal principles that can replace it. Every substantive account of distrib-
utive justice is a local account.
Id. at 313-14; see also WALZER, supra note 231, at 39 ("The outsider can become a sodal critic
only if he manages to get himself inside, [and] enters imaginatively into local practices and
arrangements.").
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faithless to the single most important social practice we have: the prac-
tice of worrying about what justice really is."265
Walzer has responded to the relativism charge by refining his def-
inition of internal social criticism. For example, in Thick and Thin:
Moral Arguments at Home and Abroad,266 he begins with a television im-
age of protesters in communist Czechoslovakia in 1989 carrying signs
"some of which say, simply, 'Truth' and others 'Justice."'267 From a
Walzerian perspective, these signs appeal to universal principles of
"truth" and 'Justice," which act as foundations for a more expansive
and relevant moral structure applicable to the particular situation of a
people trying to free themselves from communist tyranny: "[D]ualism
is ... an internal feature of every morality. Philosophers most often
describe it in terms of a (thin) set of universal principles adapted
(thickly) to these or those historical circumstances." 268 This concep-
tion of moral discourse is consistent with the theory that "[m] en and
women everywhere begin with some ... set of ideas and principles,
which they then work up in many different ways. They start thin, as it
were, and thicken with age, as if in accordance with our deepest intui-
tion about what it means to develop and mature."269
According to Walzer, however, "our intuition is wrong here. Mo-
rality is thick from the very beginning, culturally integrated, fully reso-
nant, and it reveals itself thinly only on special occasions, when moral
language is turned to specific purposes." 270 Thus, Americans who saw
the Czechoslovakian protesters on television marched with them, in
one sense, because they shared a "common understanding of tyr-
anny."271 But apart from that understanding, which is undoubtedly
important and can give aid and comfort to the protestors, American
citizens' own distinctive minimal morality also separated them from
the marchers. 27 2
265 Dworkin & Walzer, supra note 256, at 114.
266 MICHAEL WALZER, THICKAND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD (1994)
[hereinafter WALZER, THICK & THIN]. Walzer also discusses the role that internal social
criticism plays in discussions of morality and justice in WALZER, supra note 231, and
MICHAEL WALZER, THE COMPANY OF CRICS (1988).
267 WALZER, THICK & THIN, supra note 266, at 1.
268 Id. at 4.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 3.
272 See id. at 9-11. This thin morality, according to Walzer,
is necessarily expressive of our own thick morality. A moral equivalent of
Esperanto is probably impossible-or, rather, just as Esperanto is much
closer to European languages than to any others, so minimalism when it is
expressed as Minimal Morality will be forced into the idiom and orientation
of one of the maximal moralities. There is no neutral (unexpressive) moral
language.
Id. at 9.
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Walzer argues that the fundamental problem with the liberal view
of political morality is that its thinness is heavily coated with a particu-
lar maximalist morality. In other words,
the minimal morality prescribed by [liberal] theories is simply ab-
stracted from, and not very far from, contemporary democratic cul-
ture. If no such culture existed, this particular version of minimal
morality would not even be plausible to us. Maximalism in fact pre-
cedes minimalism. But no particular maximum is the sole source of
the moral minimum, let alone of all the other maximums.2 73
Liberals such as Dworkin may believe that they are applying universal
principles of justice when evaluating, for example, the right to free
speech in China or the right to an abortion in the United States, but
they are actually applying their own particular mix of minimalist and
maximalist morality.274
This does not mean, as Dworkin's critique of Walzer's relativism suggests, that criti-
cism of the internal arrangements of a nation will be impossible from the outside. Those
on the outside looking into the former Czechoslovakia were able to "pick out from among
our values and commitments those that make it possible for us to march vicariously with
the people in Prague." Id. at 9-10. Walzer notes that the result of our marching vicariously
with the protesters
will be a set of standards to which all societies can be held-negative injunc-
tions, most likely, rules against murder, deceit, torture, oppression, and
tyranny. Among ourselves, late twentieth-century Americans or Europeans,
these standards will probably be expressed in the language of rights, which
is the language of our own moral maximalism.
Id at 10.
These standards, while having a universal appeal, have limits, as Walzer explains:
[U]niversal prohibitions barely begin to determine the shape of a fully de-
veloped or livable morality. They provide a framework for any possible
(moral) life, but only a framework, with all the substantive details still to be
filled in before anyone could actually live in one way rather than another.
It is not until the conversations become continuous and the understandings
thicken that we get anything like a moral culture, withjudgment, value, the
goodness of persons and things realized in detail. One cannot simply de-
duce a moral culture, or for that matter a legal system, from the minimal
code.
WALZER, supra note 231, at 25.
273 WALZER, THICK & THIN, supra note 266, at 13. Walzer continues his description of
this problem by urging that
[u]nless we can identity [sic] a neutral starting point from which many dif-
ferent and possibly legitimate moral cultures might develop, we can't con-
struct a proceduralist minimum. But there is no such starting point.
Moralities don't have a common beginning; the men and women who work
them out are not like runners in a race-who also have a common set of
rules and a common goal, neither of which play a part in the less organized
work of cultural elaboration.
Id at 14.
274 To illustrate how this process works in practice, Walzer describes how "ordinary
men and women" debate difficult issues ofjustice such as affirmative action. WALz.R, supra
note 231, at 22. Walzer argues that the starting point in such a debate consists of asking
"what is the right thing to do?" Id. This initial question does not at first glance appear to
be "about the interpretation of an existing and particular morality, for it is possible that
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According to Walzer, the preemption of tyranny and injustice
comes not from a reliance on external, and so-called objective, princi-
ples of justice, but from maintaining a separation between the differ-
ent distributive spheres within a society.2 75 While Sandel's call for the
removal of moral brackets is an effort to overlap purposefully the
spheres of politics and morality,276 Walzer's strict separation of
spheres is a form of bracketing writ large-bracketing that protects
spheres from each other across society. Political, social, economic,
and religious spheres remain separated so that their respective distrib-
utive criteria do not influence the distribution of goods in other
spheres.277
that morality, however interpreted, does not tell us the right thing to do." Id However, as
we continue to think about the issue, as
we follow the course of the argument, listen to it, study its phenomenology,
we will see that its real subject is the meaning of the particular moral life
shared by the protagonists. The general question about the right thing to
do is quickly turned into some more specific question-about the career
open to talents, let's say, and then about equal opportunity, affirmative ac-
tion, and quotas.... [These questions] require us to argue about what a
career is, what sorts of talents we ought to recognize, whether equal oppor-
tunity is a "right," and if it is, what social policies it mandates. These ques-
tions are pursued within a tradition of moral discourse-indeed, they only
arise within that tradition-and they are pursued by interpreting the terms
of that discourse.
Id. at 23.
Walzer argues that the interplay between minimalism and maximalism constrains the
relativism of his maxim that "distributive justice is relative to social meanings." WAUZER,
TucK & THIN, supra note 266, at 26 (citation omitted). Moreover, "justice in distributions
is a maximalist morality, and it takes shape along with, constrained by, a reiterated
minimalism-the very idea of 'justice,' which provides a critical perspective and a negative
doctrine." Id.
When answering Dworkin's argument that a need exists for an external and independ-
ent standard ofjustice that will act as a "critic and not a mirror," Walzer notes that tyran-
nies have historically feared internal criticism the most. Pointing to the collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe, Walzer notes that the collapse began with the criticism of
"dissident communists [who] demand[ed] that the tyrants actually deliver on the values to
which they [the tyrants] claimed to be committed (and to which their critics were really
committed): freedom, equality, and democratic government." I. at 46. While those of us
in the West could sympathize with the communist dissidents, there were limits to our soli-
darity with them because most of us would not have been able to endorse their political
program consisting of the "correct" brand of communism. See id. If Dworkin is correct,
that it is possible "to appeal to an external standard" of justice, then
one probably wouldn't bother with internal criticism at all. All the local
critics could be replaced by a universal Office of Social Criticism, where an
internationally recruited and specially trained civil service (of professional
philosophers? political theorists? theologians?) applied the same moral
principles to every country, culture, and religious community in the world.
Id. at 48.
275 See supra notes 235-52 and accompanying text.
276 See supra Part 1l.1B.2.
277 Most Americans are already quite comfortable in protecting the sphere of religion
from the distributive principles of other spheres, and protecting other spheres from reli-
gion's distributive principles. The separation between church and state is ingrained in the
political consciousness of most Americans. Walzer proposes a similar respect for the sepa-
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B. Walzer from a Gay Rights Perspective
A discussion of gay rights issues within a Walzerian framework of
justice does not begin with the traditional and familiar liberal con-
cepts of privacy and autonomy. Instead, the starting place is an assess-
ment of the distributive principles used to allocate social goods that
are of particular importance to gay men and lesbians. To my knowl-
edge, Walzer has mentioned homosexuality only once in his work.2 78
It is therefore necessary to apply Walzer's theory of justice to gay
rights issues by discussing two hotly disputed social issues in contem-
porary America: (1) same-sex marriage279 and (2) families headed by
gay and lesbian parents. 280
The application of Walzer's theory to gay rights issues will not
lead to results that are different from those reached through the appli-
cation of liberal theory.28 ' In other words, formulation of pro-gay
rights arguments from the perspective of both theories is possible.
What is particularly interesting about applying Walzer's ideas to con-
temporary disputes over gay rights issues, then, is not the outcomes of
the application, but the analytical process that leads to those out-
comes. To a greater extent than liberal theory, Walzer's theory allows
for a full engagement of the normative traditions and values behind
the distribution of social goods that are at the center of our society's
struggles over homosexuality. Unlike many liberal theorists, Walzer
does not limit his focus to the relationship between the individual and
the state; instead, Walzer broadens the analysis to include the social
and nonpolitical roles and meanings of the particular institutions and
goods at issue.
1. Same-Sex Marriage
From a traditional liberal perspective, gay men and lesbians have
an equality-based right to marriage.28 2 Under this view, the state
should be neutral in its application of marriage rules and provide gay
men and lesbians with an equal opportunity to attain the legal bene-
fits that flow from marriage.28 3 The prohibition of same-sex marriage
ration among the other spheres. When individual spheres receive protection from the
domination of other spheres, the attainment of complex equality and justice will be mani-
fest. See supra notes 235-52 and accompanying text.
278 Walzer notes that "despite a succession of liberation struggles," incest and polyg-
amy are "ruled out" and " [h] omosexual marriage remains legally unrecognized and politi-
cally controversial." WALZER, supra note 34, at 228.
279 See infra Part III.B.l.
280 See infra Part III.B.2.
281 See supra text accompanying note 32.
282 See, e.g., SuLuxVA, supra note 15, at 178-80 (asserting that the denial of the right to
marry "is the most public affront possible to [homosexuals'] public equality").
283 See id.
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is a form of impermissible discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation and gender 284 that entails a preference of some consensual re-
lationships over others and, thus, violates the liberal tenet of state
neutrality.28 5 The state's recognition of same-sex marriage would not
constitute an approval of gay and lesbian relationships, but would sim-
ply allow for equal access to a state-provided privilege. 286
In contrast to this liberal argument, a Walzerian critique would
be more particular in analyzing the societal context from which the
prohibition against same-sex marriage emerges. Walzer recognizes
that marriage, like any other social good, is subject to distributive pat-
terns.28 7 The meaning that society attaches to marriage arises from a
people's own particularized traditions; as a result, different cultures
regulate marriage differently. As Walzer explains,
[t]hroughout most of human history, love and marriage have been
far more closely regulated than they are in the United States today.
The rules of kinship are an anthropological feast, wonderfully vari-
ous and highly seasoned. There are a hundred ways in which the
basic distributive question-Who . . . whom?-is asked and an-
swered. Who can sleep with whom? Who can marry whom? Who
lives with whom? Who eats with whom? Who celebrates with
whom? Who must show respect to whom? Who is responsible for
whom? The answers to these questions constitute an elaborate sys-
tem of rules, and it is a feature of the earliest understanding of
political power that chiefs or princes who violate these rules are
tyrants. 2 88
According to a central tenet of liberalism, issues of personal inti-
macy should be outside of the control of government and community:
"Kinship ties and sexual relations are commonly thought to constitute
a domain beyond the reach of distributive justice."28 9 In opposition to
this view, Walzer notes that "[i]t would . . . be a mistake to think of
kinship and love as a sphere different from all the others, as a sacred
284 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197 (1994).
285 See SuuAN, supra note 15, at 171-72.
286 See West, supra note 160, at 726.
287 See WALZER, supra note 34, at 234-36.
288 Id. at 228.
289 Id. at 227.
For many years, feminists criticizedJohn Rawls for failing to discuss issues important to
families and women. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 89-
101 (1989); Linda P, Hirshman, Is the Original Position Inherently Male-Superior?, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1860 (1994); MariJ. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human
Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory ofJustice, 16 N.M. L. REv. 613 (1986); Kimberly A.
Yuracko, Toward Feminist Perfectionism: A Radical Critique of Rawisian Liberalism, 6 UCLA Wo-
MEN'S LJ. 1 (1995).
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precinct, like the Vatican in republican Italy, safe from philosophical
criticism."290
Long before the Industrial Revolution, "marriages were complex
matters of exchange and alliance, carefully planned and elaborately
negotiated. 291 Today, these marriages persist in some societies,
"though the negotiations nowadays are rarely explicit."292 In western
cultures until recently, a connection existed between marriage and
the advancement of the economic fortunes and social positions of the
families involved. Parents participated in selecting whom their chil-
dren married partly due to an abiding interest in promoting the fam-
ily's political, social, and economic status. In more contemporary
times, however, these considerations have receded in importance, and
the notion that love and free choice are the appropriate distributive
criteria for marriage has emerged. To use Walzerian terminology, a
clearer separation now exists between the sphere of marriage and the
spheres of politics and economics. 293 As Walzer explains,
[n]ow romantic love, more or less inflated, is conceived to be the
sole satisfactory basis for marriage and married life. But that means
that marriages are taken out of the hands of parents and their
agents (matchmakers, for example) and delivered into the hands of
children. The distributive principle of romantic love is free
choice.... [R]omantic love focuses our attention on the couple
who choose one another. And it has this crucial implication: the
man and the woman are not only free but equally free. The feeling
must be mutual, it takes two to tango, and so on.29 4
The contemporary shared social meaning of marriage in western
societies, then, holds that the choices of the individuals involved
should be the primary value in the distribution of marriage. When
two individuals decide that a sufficiently close emotional and physical
attraction exists to bind their futures together, our social norms pro-
vide that they should be able to marry. A Walzerian may therefore
argue that denying gay men and lesbians the opportunity to marry is
290 WALZER, supra note 34, at 227. Of course, many feminists also reject the public/
private distinction. See, e.g., OluN, supra note 289, at 111.
291 WALZEP, supra note 34, at 234.
292 Id.
293 See id. at 235. According to Walzer:
If family membership and political influence are entirely distinct, if nepo-
tism is ruled out, inheritance curtailed, aristocratic titles abolished, and so
on, then there is much less reason to think of marriage as either an ex-
change or an alliance. And then sons and daughters can (and will) search
for mates whom they find physically or spiritually attractive. So long as the
family was integrated into political and economic life, romantic love had its
place outside.... The independence of the family made for a relocation of
love.
Id.
294 Id.
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unjust because this prohibition is inconsistent with the norms of mari-
tal distribution in American society: Gay men and lesbians simply want
to use the accepted distributive criteria-love and free choice-that
heterosexuals use to avail themselves of the social good of marriage.
One court recently followed this line of reasoning in a decision
involving the constitutionality of Alaska's prohibition against same-sex
marriage.295 In discussing the protections that substantive due pro-
cess affords individuals, the judge stated that
[t]he question presented by this case is whether the personal deci-
sion by those who choose a mate of the same gender will be recog-
nized as the same fundamental right [identified by the Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut296 and Loving v. Virginia29 7]. Clearly,
the right to choose one's life partner is quintessentially the kind of decision
which our culture recognizes as personal and important. Though the choice
of a partner is not left to the individual in some cultures, in ours it is no one
else's to make. Indeed, the marriage license and the marriage cere-
mony themselves make clear that this must be a choice freely made
by the individual.
... The relevant question is not whether same-sex marriage is
so rooted in our traditions that it is a fundamental right, but
whether the freedom to choose one's own life partner is so rooted
in our traditions.2 98
In discussing a Walzerian analysis of the issue of same-sex mar-
riage, noting the objections of opponents of those marriages is impor-
tant. Opponents of same-sex marriages offer two principal objections:
one instrumental and the other intrinsic. The instrumental argument
seeks to link marriage to reproduction. In the minds of many, the
normative value of marriage is at least partly connected to the fact that
the creating and rearing of most new human beings occur within that
institution. 299 The intrinsic argument is more difficult to articulate,
especially when disconnected from issues of reproduction; it holds,
295 See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 24 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 1 2015 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998).
296 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
297 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
298 Brause, 24 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2015 (emphasis added). In response to this court
ruling, voters in Alaska recently approved an amendment to the state constitution that
prohibits same-sex marriage. See Liz Ruskin, Limit on Marriage Passes in Landslide,
ANcHORAGE DAILY NEvs, Nov. 4, 1998, at Al.
299 The House of Representatives' report on the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, for
example, explicitly acknowledges the need to protect "the institution of traditional hetero-
sexual marriage" and the state's interest in "encouraging responsible procreation and
child-rearing." H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 12-13 (1996).
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however, that something intrinsic to the institution of marriage re-
quires the two involved individuals to be of different genders.300
Wazer's theory ofjustice can provide a response to the first argu-
ment against same-sex marriage. In fact, a comparison between the
approaches of Walzer and Rawls is instructive. Rawls contends that
arguments based on nonpolitical values are best left outside of discus-
sions ofjustice.301 Thus, a Rawlsian response to the use of procreation
as an argument against same-sex marriage might proceed as follows:
Procreation-based arguments are largely the product of religious or
moral views that consider immoral those examples of sexual inti-
macy that have no connection with the possibility of reproduction.
Moreover, these arguments are the product of particular compre-
hensive doctrines and not political values. While individuals are
free to hold and apply those views in their personal lives, bringing
those views into the political discourse is improper.
Alternatively, a Walzerian approach would not deem improper
the inclusion of procreation in a discussion about same-sex marriage;
instead, it would seek to question whether procreation is in fact the
shared tradition that defines the meaning of marriage in our society.
For example, the fact that society would recognize and value the mar-
riage of a heterosexual couple who cannot procreate-due to age or
infertility-severely undermines the argument that procreation is the
dispositive criterion in society for the distribution of marriage. Rather
than tell opponents of same-sex marriage that they cannot bring their
reproduction-based arguments to the table because those arguments
violate the strictures of political liberalism, a Walzeian would wel-
come the arguments and then analyze, critique, and eventually under-
mine the view that our social norms require that reproduction be a
constitutive element of marriage.
An argument from within our society's shared traditions not only
helps to undermine the instrumentalist connection between marriage
and reproduction, it also exposes the inconsistencies in other argu-
ments of opponents of same-sex marriage. For example, to the extent
opponents argue that the ability to reproduce or to engage in acts of a
"reproductive type"3 0 2 is the dispositive moral criterion for defining
marriage, they are not truly arguing within a tradition that seeks to
place such values as love and commitment at the top of the normative
hierarchy in defining marriage.
300 See, e.g., Finnis, supra note 56, at 1063-66; George & Bradley, supra note 56, at 303-
10.
301 See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
302 George & Bradley, supra note 56, at 302.
[Vol. 85:443
COMMUN1TARLNISM AND GAY RIGHTS
Moreover, while critics often accuse gay men and lesbians of be-
ing obsessed with sex,30 3 it is the opponents in the same-sex marriage
debate who focus on the notion that a couple must engage in the
correct type of sexual act-vaginal-penile intercourse-before they
can deem an intimate relationship "marital."30 4 Alternatively, sup-
porters of same-sex marriage argue that the love and commitment
that exist within a relationship is important regardless of the types of
sexual acts involved.305
A discussion of same-sex marriage within the framework of
shared traditions, then, can help gay men and lesbians (and their sup-
porters) expose the inconsistency of their opponents' positions. On
one hand, the latter use love and commitment as one important mea-
sure of the value of heterosexual relationships, but on the other they
reject the view that those very same criteria are relevant when deter-
mining the goodness and eligibility for inclusion in the institution of
marriage of same-sex relationships. Walzer's internal criticism ex-
poses this inconsistency: It allows the opponents of same-sex marriage
to bring their normative arguments to the table, but then refutes
those arguments on their own terms.30 6 Within this Walzerian para-
digm of shared traditions, gay men and lesbians in the United States
are able to expose the discrepancy between the values that their oppo-
nents purportedly promote and the logical conclusions of their oppo-
nents' arguments.
While the foregoing discussion might refute the instrumentalist
argument that seeks to link marriage to reproduction from within the
sphere of marriage, addressing the intrinsic objection from the same
vantage point is more difficult, if not impossible. As mentioned previ-
ously, the intrinsic argument does not rely solely on procreation, but
views marriage as inherently heterosexual and by definition consisting
of one man and one woman. 30 7 Under this view, two men or two wo-
men might be able to love each other and even raise children to-
gether, but that arrangement is not what society means by marriage.
303 Senator Trent Lott, the Republican leader of the United States Senate, to give just
one recent example, has likened homosexuality to a form of "sex addiction." See Alison
Mitchell, Controversy over Lolt's Views of Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1998, at A24; see
also Alan Wolfe, Shut Up About Sex, Anvoc., Apr. 14, 1998, at 43, 44 (asserting that many
middle-class Americans believe that "being gay means being obsessed with sex, and most
Americans do not put sex at the center of their consciousness").
304 See Finnis, supra note 56, at 1064 ("Genital intercourse between spouses enables
them to actualize and experience... their marriage.... Non-marital intercourse, espe-
cially but not only homosexual, has no such point and therefore is unacceptable."); George
& Bradley, supra note 56, at 310 (arguing that for many people only "genital intercourse of
spouses" and not "sodomiical... acts" can be marital).
305 See Ball, supra note 36, at 1889-94; Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conserva-
tive Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261, 278 (1995).
306 See supra notes 225-46 and accompanying text.
307 See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
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A large proportion of Americans seem to subscribe to this view and
consider heterosexuality an essential and intrinsic component of
marriage.308
A skeptic of Walzer's reliance on shared understandings might
therefore argue as follows:
This country possesses a shared tradition regarding marriage: Indi-
viduals should marry people of the opposite gender. A conflict
exists between this shared tradition and the tradition that Walzer
discusses, which uses love and free choice as the appropriate distrib-
utive criteria for marriage.309 Therefore, an internal analysis of the
dispute will not provide a satisfactory answer regarding the justness
of the marriage ban.310
The person raising this argument could cite Bowers v. Hardwick,3 n
where the opinions ofJustice White312 and ChiefJustice Burgers13 em-
phasized the tradition that has historically regulated and punished gay
intimacy, rather than the tradition that recognizes the value of auton-
omy in matters of personal intimacy. How can Walzer's theory ofjus-
tice, which limits itself to internal criticisms, help individuals choose
between two traditions that seem to be mutually exclusive?
As discussed above, liberals such as Dworkin are skeptical that
Walzer's shared traditions can help resolve hotly disputed issues of
justice.3 14 In evaluating the merits of this liberal critique of Walzer's
theory, it is helpful to understand that it operates on three levels of
analyses. These levels are represented as circles in Figure 1 below. In
circle A, the outermost circle, are those universal principles of justice
that are transsocietal: They are not dependent on the norms of any
particular society, but apply to all human beings. Liberals generally
believe in the possibility of developing a list of fundamental principles
of justice, usually enforced as individual rights, that can act as univer-
308 See, e.g., Most Disapprove of Gay Marriages, Adoption, Poll Says, CHI. TRm., Aug. 19,
1996, at 6 [hereinafter Adoption Poll] (discussing a Harris poll that found that 63% of re-
spondents disapprove of marriage between two women and 64% disapprove of marriage
between two men); Polk Majority Against Gay Marriages, CHI. TRiB., Feb. 7, 1994, at 8 [here-
inafter Gay Marriages Poll] (noting that 62% of those polled opposed legal recognition of
same-sex marriage); Hanna Rosin & Richard Morin, In One Area, Americans StillDraw a Line
on Acceptability, WASH. Posr, Jan. 11, 1999, at 8 (reporting results of a national poll that
found that "only 23 percent [of those surveyed] support gay marriage").
309 See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
310 This critique is similar to Dworkin's argument that one cannot evaluate the justness
of the distribution of health care in the United States solely from within the nation's
shared traditions because there is an internally unresolvable tension between the "free
market" and the "take care of the needy" traditions. See supra notes 256-58 and accompany-
ing text.
311 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
312 See id. at 191-94.
313 See id. at 196-197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
314 See supra notes 256-65 and accompanying text.
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sal and objective guideposts of that which is fair and just. Alterna-
tively, Walzer contends that the most valuable discussions of justice
occur within circle B-within the shared traditions of a particular soci-
ety. However, Walzer does not stop there; he also believes that identi-
fiable and nonoverlapping spheres of justice exist within circle B.
Walzer argues that determinations ofjustness and unjustness must oc-
cur within each one of the spheres.3 15 One of the spheres, designated
below as circle C, is the sphere of family and marriage.3 16 Walzer
would want to assess the justice of our society's current distribution of
marriage solely within the social meanings and values as they exist
within circle C.
FIGuRE 1
CCircle A-Universal Principles
of justice
Circle B-Society's Shared
Traditions
Circle C-Sphere of Marriage
0 
& Family
Walzer makes a compelling point when he argues that most as-
sessments of justice must take place within circle B. To the extent
liberals believe that they are applying universal principles of justice,
they may underestimate the role that their personal and intellectual
attachments to particular western and liberal contemporary societies
play in the determination and articulation of those principles. Even if
one were to agree with this Walzerian critique of universalist princi-
ples,3 17 one does not have to accept Walzer's stronger thesis that indi-
viduals can discuss and resolve controversial issues of justice, such as
the best way of allocating health-care or of defining marriage, solely
within the parameters of one distributive sphere. In the context of
same-sex marriage, it is indeed difficult to see how the conflict be-
tween the tradition that promotes free choice in the selection of a
315 See supra notes 235-47 and accompanying text.
316 The other smaller circles within circle B represent Walzer's other spheres, such as
.commodities," "politics," and "religion."
317 1 will in a future article address the role that universal principles play in issues of
justice and gay rights.
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spouse and the tradition that limits that selection to a spouse of the
opposite gender can be reconciled by looking only at norms internal
to the sphere of marriage and family. The difficulty exists because
marriage as a social good has more than one meaning. As Walzer
suggests, love and free choice play an important role in determining
how society allocates marriage.3 18 A supporter of same-sex marriage
can always argue that the important value associated with marriage is
love and commitment and not the gender of the parties, but many
who believe they are abiding by the true intrinsic meaning of marriage
will reject such a view.
Ultimately, two conflicting interpretations of the meaning of mar-
riage exist, and internal resolution of the logjam is impossible. In this
context, society must make an undoubtedly normative-though not
wholly internal to the social meaning of marriage-choice of which
value is more important: love and free choice, or the gender of the
parties. Society cannot make this choice by looking at the meaning of
marriage in American culture because that meaning is multiple and
conflicting. As Amy Gutmann points out,
the social meanings of some goods are multiple and the multiple
meanings sometimes conflict, leading us to look for moral consider-
ations that can adjudicate among the conflicting meanings. These
moral considerations lead us beyond a search for the real social
meaning of the good in question to moral considerations that are
not internal to the sphere.319
Walzer would contend that the moral considerations of which
Gutmann speaks are wholly internal to a society.32 0 Even if this is true
at a macro level (i.e., even if it is true that we cannot step outside of
our places in a culture to evaluate issues ofjustice within that culture),
the moral considerations at issue cannot always be wholly internal to a
particular sphere. In order to address the political controversy con-
cerning the meaning of marriage, society must choose, or at the very
least prioritize, whether free choice or the gender of the parties
should be the normatively dispositive criterion in the social definition
of marriage. In advocating prioritization of the former over the latter,
gay men and lesbians (and their supporters) can point out how auton-
omy and free choice pervade across political, economic, and social
spheres in the social traditions of the American nation.321 In fact, an
318 See supra notes 287-94 and accompanying text.
319 Amy Gutmann, Justice Across the Spheres, in PLURALISM, JuSTIcE, AND EQUALrTY, supra
note 240, at 99, 99.
320 See supra notes 225-34, 266-74 and accompanying text.
321 According to Gutmann,
many relevant moral considerations cut across distributive spheres.
Although individual responsibility is not specific to the social meaning of
any good, it is relevant to the distribution of many. When we draw upon all
504 [Vol. 85:443
COMMUNITARIANISM AND GAY RIGHTS
autonomy-based argument in favor of same-sex marriage is attractive
from a gay and lesbian perspective precisely because those Americans
who might otherwise be skeptical about the normative value of same-
sex relationships may find arguments based on autonomy and free
choice appealing, because these are concepts that history has deeply
woven into the American tradition ofjustice.3 22 Ultimately, however,
whether the argument fails or succeeds depends on its effectiveness in
using the values of autonomy and free choice, as they cut across
spheres, to criticize and undermine the shared tradition that links marriage
to only unions between persons of opposite genders.323
Even if Walzer's theory cannot easily address the intrinsic argu-
ment against same-sex marriage, his theory can help gay men and les-
bians, in the context of marriage, by showing society that the social
good of marriage is not merely that which the state determines. Lib-
erals, of course, worry primarily about protecting individuals from
state-sponsored discrimination. They largely focus on the role of gov-
ernment as the regulator of marriage, because the government grants
the privilege to enter into the institution and assigns most of the cor-
responding benefits. While the state obviously has the final word on
how to define marriage, many components of marriage are not de-
pendent on state action. Even the optimal amount of governmental
regulation-the balance that liberals always try to strike-over mar-
riage will be insufficient for a complete understanding of the justness
or unjustness of the distribution of marriage in society. According to
Walzer,
[m] arriage is rarely what John Selden called it: "nothing but a civil
contract." It is part of a larger system, which legislators ordinarily
deal with only at the margins or after the fact, for the moral and
the moral resources at our disposal, we find thatjustice is complex, but not
specific to each sphere.
Gutmann, supra note 319, at 99.
322 In other work, I elaborate on the role that the normative value of autonomy can
play in imposing an obligation on society to recognize same-sex marriage. See Ball, supra
note 36, at 1936-42. I discuss autonomy in the context of society's obligations to individu-
als with disabilities in Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, and Disability, 47 UCLA L. REv. 599
(2000).
323 My skepticism about the ability to keep distributive spheres separate when con-
fronting difficult issues ofjustice, such as same-sex marriage, is consistent with my criticism
of the moral bracketing of political liberalism that seeks to separate the sphere of morality
from that of politics. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text. If the maintenance of a
strict separation among spheres were possible, then an additional gay rights argument
from a Walzerian perspective might be available: Even if one were to conclude that gay
men and lesbians are not entitled to marry because their relationships do not fit within the
definition of marriage as determined by our shared traditions, Walzer's theory ofjustice
would prohibit that view from spilling over into other spheres such as that of employment.
See supra notes 235-52 and accompanying text.
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also the spatial arrangement of "private" life: homes, meals, visits,
duties, expressions of feeling, and transfers of goods.324
Furthermore, as Walzer notes, if individuals "are free to love and
marry as they please, there must be a social space, a set of arrangements
and practices, within which they can make their choices." 325 Even
within the highly autonomous American culture, social practices exist
relating to courtship and marriage that aim to promote and support
individuals' "choices" to enter into, and stay within, the institution of
marriage. For example, the ritual of entering into an engagement
prior to marriage provides an opportunity to notify the community of
families and friends of the upcoming marriage and permits that com-
munity to begin the process of celebrating and supporting the union.
Thus, society, and not merely government, gives value and ex-
alted recognition to individuals who marry while at the same time
demeaning or failing to recognize the intimate relationships of those
who do not have that option. An examination of marriage as a social
good subject to distribution according to community norms, and not
simply as a legal construct involving certain rights, facilitates an evalu-
ation of how society, and, again, not merely government, distributes
the social good of marriage.3 2 6
2. Gay and Lesbian Parents
While some liberals, when addressing issues of justice, have
largely ignored the family by assuming that its processes and dynamics
are outside of both permissible regulation by government and the
concern ofjustice,3 2 7 Walzer specifically acknowledges that the family
is a sphere ofjustice unto itself.3 28 Walzer is particularly interested in
how the world beyond the sphere of the family reflects what goes on
within it. Thus, he focuses on how "the larger world" reflects "sex
roles" largely determined from within the family.3 29 He argues that
society imposes those roles "upon a range of activities to which sex is
324 WALZER, supra note 34, at 228 (footnote omitted).
325 Id. at 236 (emphasis added); see also JOSEPH RAZ, ExHics IN THE PUBLIC Dorm:
EssAys iN THE MoasrA oF LAW AND Pouncs 42 (1994) (noting that "It]he ability of peo-
ple to have aparticular relationship depends on its being established by socialpractices known
to them, and which they share, at least to some degree" (emphases added)).
326 See Walzer, supra note 171, at 17 ("[T)he state is not in fact the only or even, for
ordinary people in their everyday lives, the most important social union. All sorts of other
groups continue to exist and to give shape and purpose to the lives of their members,
despite the triumph of individual rights .... ."); see also PHELAN, supra note 17, at 16 ("[Op-
pression] does not always result from state action. It issues, rather, from the entire social
matrix of which politics is but a part.").
327 See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
328 See WALZER, supra note 34, at 227-42.
329 Id. at 240.
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entirely irrelevant."330 This use of sex roles to allocate social goods
outside of the family-in the spheres, for example, of employment
and politics-creates injustices: "The family itself must be reformed so
that its power no longer reaches into [other spheres]."s33
Because Walzer concentrates on the effects of sex roles outside of
the family, some scholars have criticized him for "underestimat[ing]
the effects of sex roles on the domination of women within the fam-
ily."33 2 The paucity of discussion in Walzer's Spheres ofjustice regarding
parenting is consistent with his lack of attention to internal family dy-
namics. 333 However, the large number of gay men and lesbians who
choose to have or adopt children necessitates an exploration of how
sexual orientation and family law issues fit within Walzer's theory of
justice. I provide below a brief exploration of this issue; a more com-
plete account-that merits an article by itself-would seek to deter-
mine the many values and norms that influence society's definition of
parent.
Scholars can analyze issues of justice relating to gay and lesbian
parents in at least two ways. One is the traditional liberal method that
emphasizes voluntariness and equality.33 4 Under this paradigm, gay
men and lesbians who choose to parent have the same rights and obli-
gations as heterosexual parents. A second, more Walzerian approach,
would not begin the analysis by looking at voluntariness or equality
per se, but would seek to determine what parenting means in our soci-
ety. As discussed above, the Walzerian conception of justice requires
an examination into the social meaning of the particular good and its
distributive criteria that are the subject of discussion.3 35
Similar to the decision to marry, the decision to have children
occurs within a social normative framework that (1) expects couples
to have children and (2) rewards those that do.3 36 Government pro-
330 Id
331 Id.
332 Susan Moiler Okin, Politics and the Complex Inequalities of Gender, in PLURALISM, Jus-
CE, AND EQuALrr, supra note 240, at 120, 125. In another work, Okin notes: "On a
number of occasions, Walzer criticizes the operation of the gender system outside the fan-
ily. But in spite of the fact that his separate spheres criterion would seem to demand it, he
pays almost no attention to the continued operation of the gender structure within the
family." Onmi, supra note 289, at 114.
333 Walzer does mention that "parents today are more likely to take pride in their
children's achievements than are children in the status of their parents .... This, too, is a
product of the separation of the family from politics and economy, the decline of national
and local dynasties, the triumph of complex equality." WALzER, supra note 34, at 242.
334 Cf. Ball, supra note 36, at 1873 (noting that gay rights proponents traditionally em-
phasize values of "neutrality, equality, and toleration").
335 See supra Part IlI.A.
336 See generally PRONATALISM: THE MyrH OF Moms & APPLE PIE (Ellen Peck & Judith
Senderowitz eds., 1974) (discussing the societal pressure to become a parent and its associ-
ated biases);JEAN E. Vzvms, CHILDLESS BY CHOICE 110-16 (1980) (discussing the different
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vides a myriad of services, from subsidized day care to education, that,
at least for some, reduce the expenses of having children. In addi-
tion, the liberal American society affords constitutional protection for
the right to reproduce337 and the parent's right to make decisions
affecting a child without undue state interference.338 But as with mar-
riage, community norms that have nothing to do with governmental
subsidies or enforcement of individual rights define many aspects of
parenting. The decision to become a parent often results from com-
plex assessments of what feels right to the individuals involved and
what they perceive society expects of them. In fact, one of the most
important values or satisfactions that comes with having children is
"[a]dult status and social identity," a value that "fulfills the need to be
accepted as a responsible and mature adult member of the commu-
nity."3 39 Another value that accompanies having children is the
"[e]xpansion of the self," which "fulfills the need to have new growth
and learning experiences and to add meaning to life. '3 40 Other
"[m] oral values" also "satisf[y] the need for moral improvement, in-
cluding becoming less selfish and learning to sacrifice, [and] mak[e]
a contribution to society."34'
The notions of wanting to raise children in order to "add mean-
ing to one's life" and to satisfy societal expectations, while often moti-
vating factors behind the decision of couples to have children,3 42 fit
rather awkwardly, if at all, within the liberal paradigm. Many people
view parenting as an important component of leading a good life, yet
liberals such as John Rawls want to exclude considerations of what
constitutes a good life from discussions ofjustice. Rawls would rather
focus on whether parenting by gay men and lesbians allows for "the
nurturing and development of [politically and socially aware] citizens
in appropriate numbers to maintain an enduring society."343 Rawls
aspects of "pronatalism" and the "negative traits attributed to persons who do not have
children"); Paula Abrams, The Tradition of Reproduction, 37 Aiz. L. REv. 453 (1995) (consid-
ering traditions related to reproduction and issues of reproductive control).
337 See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (noting that
"[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race").
338 See Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that the
compulsory Education Act of 1922 "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control"); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (determining that a state law prohibiting school
instruction in any language other than English impermissibly interfered "with the power of
parents to control the education of their [children]").
339 Gerald Y. Michaels, Motivational Factors in the Decision and Timing of Pregnancy, in
THE TRANsMON TO PARENTHOOD: CuR.RENT THEORY AND RESEARCH 23, 29 (Gerald Y.
Michaes & Wendy A. Goldberg eds., 1988).
340 Id.
341 Id.
342 See supra notes 339-41 and accompanying text.
343 Rawls, supra note 21, at 788.
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must limit himself in this way to abide by his liberal limits on public
reasoning.34 4 However, this shows that limiting the discussion to
purely political values excludes from the debate many of the impor-
tant values and norms that influence the societal definition of the
good in question, in this case parenting. Walzer's model, on the other
hand, allows for constructive debate about the societal definition and
expectations of parenting to see whether parenting by gay men and
lesbians is consistent with that definition.
Ultimately, we cannot expect a gay or lesbian individual who lives
in a society that places such high value on the decision to have chil-
dren to be immune from the community-based norms that define the
meaning and value of parenting. Typically, he or she grows up in a
traditional family where children are, or should be, the most impor-
tant part of their parents' lives. He or she also lives in a culture that
expects, respects, and, to some extent, subsidizes child-bearing and
rearing. Yet when that same gay or lesbian individual, as an adult, de-
cides to have a child, many heterosexuals, even some who might
otherwise denounce discrimination against gay men and lesbians in
housing and employment,3 45 balk at the idea of families headed by
homosexuals. 346
Part of this objection stems from a belief that the (homo)sexual
relationships of parents harms their children.3 47 The social science
literature in this area has found no evidence of harm.3 48 Perhaps no
amount of social science data will convince some that the sexual ori-
entation and relationships of gay men and lesbians will not harm their
children. Nonetheless, in the absence of evidence of harm to the chil-
dren, the question remains whether, given the framework under
which our culture values and distributes parenting as a social good (to
use Walzerian terminology), excluding from parenting those gay and
lesbian individuals who are willing and able to provide love, nurtur-
ing, and moral guidance to their children is unjust. Society often at-
tempts to exclude gay men and lesbians from the societal good of
parenting despite the fact that the vast majority of the gay men and
344 See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
345 See Gay Marriages Poll, supra note 308, at 8 (reporting on Newsweek poll finding that
74% of those surveyed favored protecting gay men and lesbians from' employment discrim-
ination and 81% favored similar protection from housing discrimination).
346 See Adoption Poll, supra note 308, at 6 (reporting on Harris poll finding that "61
percent disapprove of a female couple who live together adopting a child, and 65 percent
disapprove of two men who live together adopting a child").
347 See generally Lynn D. Warde, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children,
1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 833, 852-87 (discussing the potential negative effects on children of
having gay or lesbian parents).
348 See, e.g., Ball & Pea, supra note 193, at 272-308; Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of
Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHiLD DEv. 1025 (1992).
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lesbians who raise children act consistently with the shared meanings
and traditions of what it means to be a parent.3 49
As with same-sex marriage, the application of Walzer's theory of
justice to the issue of parenting by gay men and lesbians does not lead
to results that differ from those reached through the application of
liberal theory; both theories can lead us to conclusions favorable to
gay rights positions. Unlike liberal theory, however, Walzer's theory
fully engages the normative traditions and values behind the institu-
tion of parenting. It allows for a discussion of justice that struggles
directly with the meaning and role of parenting in society.
What Walzer's theory of justice lacks is an antecedent commit-
ment to the protection of human autonomy regardless of a society's
contemporary distributive patterns. As I argue below, gay men and
lesbians are unlikely to embrace fully a theory of justice that does not
place autonomy at the top of its normative hierarchy. As I also argue
below, however, this indispensable commitment to autonomy, and
thus to liberalism in one form or another, on the part of gay men and
lesbians (and their supporters) should not preclude a recognition of
the validity of some communitarian critiques of liberalism.
IV
THE LESSONS FOR GAY MEN AND LESBIANS IN THE
COMMuNrrAmAN CGrrIQuTE OF LIBERALISM
Gay men and lesbians in America have experienced major trans-
formations over the last few decades. Many have difficulty leading ful-
filling lives while remaining isolated from each other and from the
rest of society. Participation in burgeoning and enriching gay and les-
bian communities remedies the isolation from each other; these com-
munities play an integral role in providing individual gay men and
lesbians with the human ties and bonds that are essential for leading
lives of dignity and pride. °50 Open participation in many of the tradi-
tional institutions and communities of mainstream American life,
such as family, marriage, churches, and corporations, 51 reduces the
isolation from the rest of society. As a result of these transformations,
the vision of the atomistic gay person-alone and isolated-becomes
less descriptively accurate.
Therefore, theoreticians of gay rights must incorporate the value
of community and the role of social encumbrances and attachments
349 See generally Ball & Pea, supra note 193 (arguing that gay and straight couples desire
children largely for the same reasons).
350 See supra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
351 See SIGNORILE, supra note 14, at xv-xvi (discussing how gay men and lesbians are
openly integrating themselves into the lives of their biological families, the congregations
of many churches and synagogues, and places of work).
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into the liberal theory of political morality that has acted as the princi-
pal foundation for gay rights positions over the last three decades.
Fortunately, some liberal philosophers have sought to weave commu-
nitarian ideas into their liberal conceptions of justice. For example,
Ronald Dworkin recognizes the role of a liberal community in con-
necting individuals' sense of what constitutes a good life with their
conceptions of liberal political morality.352 Joseph Raz, in his brand
of perfectionist liberalism, emphasizes the role that common goods
play in questions ofjustice. 353 Raz also recognizes that the liberal state
must promote a particular conception of the good life: true auton-
omy.3 54 These modified versions of liberalism, and Raz's in particular,
constitute appealing theoretical foundations for gay rights
positions.3 55
Recognizing and cherishing the positive values of community
from a gay and lesbian perspective, however, must not diminish liber-
alism's commitment to individual rights and autonomy. The freedom
that liberalism provides by respecting individual autonomy allows free
and open consideration of whether questions regarding the value of
community need to supplement issues of autonomy.3 56
In the political environment in which the current debate about
gay men and lesbians and their relationships occurs, we as a society
share few thick values that can act as conveyors of real harmony, much
less help reach some sort of truth. In this environment, neither
Sandel's constitutive communities3 57 nor Walzer's shared traditions3 58
can provide gay men and lesbians with a comforting sense that society
will respect their autonomy and humanity in most circumstances. In
this context, the question then becomes how will society treat, or pun-
ish, or regulate gay men and lesbians in the absence of an agreement
about "the nature of their cause?"35 9 An exclusive reliance on com-
mon goods and the promotion of community ties and civic virtue will
not be enough to protect those whose choices large segments of soci-
ety will often reject.8 60 As Shane Phelan points out, "[wi e can safely
352 See Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REv. 479, 502-04 (1989).
353 See RAz, supra note 254, at 202-09.
354 See i& at 407-20.
355 See Ball, supra note 36, at 1926-30, 1936-42.
356 As Markate Daly explains, "Eclommunitarianism is a postliberal philosophy in the
sense that it could only have developed within a liberal tradition of established democratic
practices, and in a liberal culture that had allowed community values to decline to the
extent that a corrective seemed necessary." Daly, supra note 10, at xiii; see also West, supra
note 160, at 710 (noting, in addressing communitarians' critique of liberalism, that "it
would be wrong to jettison either the universalist or individualist aspirations of
liberalism").
357 See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
358 See supra notes 225-40, 266-74 and accompanying text.
359 See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
360 As Amy Gutmann starkly warns,
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dispense with [the liberal notions of rights, individual freedom, and
dignity] only as long as we trust that our community will never arrive
at a truth that requires our subjugation. Few of us can be so
secure."
361
Even Sandel acknowledges the risk of coercion that can accom-
pany civic republicanism: "The coercive face of soulcraft is by no
means unknown among American republicans." 62 He adds that
"civic education need not take so harsh a form. In practice, successful
republican soulcraft involves a gentler kind of tutelage. 3 63 Ulti-
mately, however, civic republicanism does not provide an institutional
framework that can guarantee that the "republican soulcraft" will be
gentle rather than harsh. To his credit, Sandel acknowledges this
point:
To accord the political community a stake in the character of its
citizens is to concede the possibility that bad communities may form
bad characters. Dispersed power and multiple sites of civic forma-
tion may reduce these dangers but cannot remove them. This is the
truth in the liberal's complaint about republican politics.364
Amitai Etzioni, another leading communitarian thinker, is san-
guine about our ability to distinguish good communities from bad
communities. After criticizing the liberal penchant for highlighting
the oppressive characteristics of communities, he notes that enlight-
ened communitarians "seek a balance between diversity and unity."365
Like Sandel, however, Etzioni provides no fall-back position regarding
what to do, other than rely on people's good will and sense of civic
virtue, when the balance between diversity and unity shifts toward the
latter. Unless and until communitarians convince gay men and lesbi-
ans otherwise, the only practical institutional framework that can main-
tain the balance is the enforcement of individual rights.3 66
[t]he common good of the Puritans of seventeenth-century Salem com-
manded them to hunt witches; the common good of the Moral Majority of
the twentieth century commands them not to tolerate homosexuals. The
enforcement of liberal rights, not the absence of settled community, stands
between the Moral Majority and the contemporary equivalent of witch
hunting.
Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHiL. & PuB. AFF. 308, 319 (1985); see
also Phelan, supra note 17, at 146 ("In the United States, the civic republican tradition has
always been challenged by the fear that republicans will not act to protect the minority.
Every 'consensus' has been haunted by the suspicion that it is incomplete, perhaps even
coercive. It is this suspicion that has kept liberalism alive.").
361 PHELAN, supra note 17, at 159.
362 SANDEL, supra note 61, at 319.
363 Id. at 319-20.
364 Id. at 321.
365 Amitai Etzioni, A Moderate Communitarian Proposa4 24 POL THEORY 155, 158 (1996).
866 Etzioni seems to concede this point when he accepts the validity of using the Bill of
Rights to "single[ ] out matters that are exempt from majority rule and from typical demo-
cratic rule making." Id. at 162.
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Similarly, Walzer's prioritization of shared traditions within his
theory of justice may leave gay men and lesbians, who as a group are
often on the losing side of those traditions, feeling uncomfortable and
insecure about their places in the broader society. A progressive
agenda of gay rights often entails a necessary shift away from, or at
least a questioning of, society's most deeply held traditions, such as
the view that marriage and good parenting require two individuals of
opposite genders.
Of course, as society's traditions change in favor of greater toler-
ance and equality, gay rights advocates will be able to formulate their
arguments consistent with those shifting societal mores. But societal
norms change in both directions; the possibility and reality of back-
lash and intolerance make gay men and lesbians appropriately reliant
on the uncompromising protection of individual autonomy that only
liberalism can provide.
Liberalism, with its respect for the autonomy and freedom of in-
dividuals, then, is well-suited to protect gay men and lesbians from
coercion and harassment, especially by public institutions. Liberalism
provides for the necessary personal freedom and independence that
allow individuals to pursue their own lives and desires. Thus, liber-
alism validly and appropriately appeals to gay men and lesbians.
Liberalism, however, also has its own limitations for gay men and
lesbians. First, it fails to recognize sufficiently the positive role that
communities which marginalized individuals construct can have in the
lives of those individuals. The liberal paradigm's focus on individual
rights and autonomy cannot easily account for the value of commu-
nity in the lives of gay men and lesbians. As I have argued in this
Article, that value is twofold: First, it contributes to the identity of gay
men and lesbians, and second, it acts as a buffer that, along with the
enforcement of liberal individual rights to privacy and equality, pro-
tects gay men and lesbians from harassment and discrimination ema-
nating from the broader society.3 6 7
One of the reasons liberals do not describe communities in a pos-
itive light when discussing issues of justice is that they often view com-
munities as sources of oppression, coercion, and anti-individualism.368
367 See supra notes 142-55, 174-79 and accompanying text.
368 See, e.g., H.N. Hirsch, The Threnody of Liberalism: Constitutional Liberty and the Renewal
of Community, 14 POL. THEORY 423, 434-35 (1986) (arguing that the only way to create
communities is through homogeneity and moral education, both of which "can be politi-
cally dangerous in several ways: by encouraging the exclusion of outsiders; by encouraging
indoctrination or irrationalism; by compromising privacy and autonomy");Jeffrey Reiman,
Liberalism and Its Critis, in THE LIBERAUSM-COMmrrAmrAmNSM DEBATE, supra note 1, at 19,
30 ("Those who think that liberalism is community's enemy, and who would instead start
by teaching people to share some set of values, would essentially force a conformity on
people that is related to true community in the way that forced religious observance is
related to true faith."). As Daly explains,
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These liberals, however, fail to recognize that oppression has implica-
tions for community formation as well. In other words, when faced by
society's oppression, marginalized individuals such as gay men and les-
bians often seek the solace and support that only the human ties and
bonds found within their own communities can provide. The enforce-
ment of individual lights of autonomy and privacy will not on their
own ameliorate the oppression experienced by gay men and lesbians
in society because that oppression has deep roots in the almost vis-
ceral reaction by many Americans to gay men and lesbians and their
relationships. 36 9
Even if the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick370 had struck down the
Georgia sodomy statute as unconstitutional, and even if gay men and
lesbians today enjoyed the full panoply of legal protections that consti-
tutional rights to privacy and autonomy can guarantee, the reality is
that prejudices against homosexuals would remain largely undis-
turbed. As the experience of African Americans in our country dem-
onstrates, the enforcement of liberal rights can accomplish only so
much. Even if our society fully enforced liberal individual rights, com-
munities would still play a crucial role in protecting gay men and lesbi-
ans from the prejudices of others. Instead of either ignoring
communities altogether or viewing them with apprehension and dis-
trust, liberal theory should recognize that community often plays an
important role in promoting freedom and dignity.371
[liberals] fear that a philosophy in which community is the fundamental
good would legitimate features of existing communities that are unaccept-
able in a democratic society-for example, authoritarian culture, en-
trenched social hierarchy, and male dominance. Liberals fear that a
community-centered political philosophy could lead to government intru-
sion in private affairs and suffocating conformity in social life.
Daly, supra note 10, at xviii-xix.
369 In his recent study of the attitudes of middle-class Americans, Alan Wolfe found
that many of those he surveyed
had no trouble finding these words, all of which cropped up in (his] inter-
views when the subject of homosexuality was raised: "abnormal," "immoral,"
"sinful," "unacceptable," "sick," "unhealthy," "untrustworthy," "mentally ill,"
"wrong," "perverted" and "mentally deficient." In all likelihood, Americans
are less homophobic than they were before the gay rights revolution, but
middle-class Americans have not come to the conclusion that homosexual-
ity represents an alternative that is the moral equal of any other.
Alan Wolfe, The HomosexualException, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 46, 47; see
also Rosin & Morin, supra note 308, at 8 (noting that while a majority of Americans "now
finds divorce, sex before marriage, interracial relationships and single motherhood accept-
able," a recent survey found that 57% considered "homosexuality" unacceptable, and 72%
deemed "gay sex" to be "outside the bounds of acceptability"). For a further discussion of
Wolfe's findings, see ALAN WoLFs, ONE NATION, A=rER ALL 72-81 (1998).
370 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
371 See Buchanan, supra note 5, at 878 (noting that it is appropriate for "advocate [s] of
the liberal thesis [to] embrace an expanded psychology and a richer theory of the good
and [to] admit that not only autonomy but also community is of fundamental impor-
tance"); see alsoJane Mansbridge, Feminism and Democratic Community, in DvI)ocmTnc COM-
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The second limitation of traditional liberalism is that it fails to
recognize that the right, as Sandel likes to point out, is often linked to
the good.372 Contemporary gay rights arguments are often supported
by the belief that committed same-sex relationships are good relation-
ships and that most gay and lesbian parents are good parents. These
arguments rely heavily on the normatively valuable in articulating pro-
gay rights positions. The separation of the right from the good that
Rawlsian liberalism demands, while well-intentioned with its aim to
promote tolerance and equality for all minorities, ultimately inade-
quately captures the complexity of the issues involved.3 73
The third limitation of liberalism relates to its scope and applica-
bility. Liberals always try to strike a balance between the state and the
individual: They ask where society should draw the line to protect the
individual from the actions of the state. As Walzer correctly argues,
however, societal norms and understandings that go beyond what the
state dictates play crucial roles in defining social goods and their
methods of distribution.3 74 For example, the debate over same-sex
marriage not only concerns the practical, and undoubtedly important,
benefits that the state provides to married couples, but also addresses
notions of acceptance and a "sense of belonging to the
community."3 75
The history of the same-sex marriage issue in Hawaii illustrates
this point. The Hawaii legislature, in response to a judicial opinion
that questioned the constitutionality of the ban on same-sex mar-
riage,376 enacted a comprehensive domestic partnership statute that
grants nontraditional couples many of the same state-provided bene-
fits that married couples enjoy.377 These types of compromises, how-
ever, do not satisfy most gay men and lesbians; they want not only
equal access to state-provided benefits, but also inclusion in the socie-
tal institution of marriage, in its norms and traditions, with the legiti-
macy, acceptance, and recognition that follow. 378
TuNrr, supra note 1, at 339, 339 ("The challenge . . . is to find ways of strengthening
community ties while developing institutions to protect individuals from community
oppression.").
372 See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
373 See supra notes 41-60 and accompanying text.
374 See supra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
375 Charles J. Butler, Note, The Defense of Marriage Act: Congress's Use of Narrative in the
Debate over Same-Sex Marriage 73 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 841, 871 (1998).
376 See Baehr v. Lein, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
377 See HAw. RE:V. STAT. ANN. § 572C (Michie Supp. 1998).
378 See Butler, supra note 375, at 871 ("[T]he symbolism of legal recognition is perhaps
more important to lesbians and gays than the actual legal benefits that flow from mar-
riage.");John Gallagher, Love & War, ADvoc.,July 23, 1996, at 22, 28 (noting that propos-
als for domestic partnership laws "clearly do[ ] not strike the same emotional chord among
gays and lesbians" as does marriage).
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The latest chapter in the Hawaii same-sex marriage saga also
shows the limitations of relying exclusively on liberal principles ofjus-
tice. The voters in Hawaii recently authorized the legislature to
amend the state constitution to prohibit same-sex marriages.3 79 The
litigation challenging the ban on same-sex marriages, which began
several years before the constitutional amendment appeared on the
ballot, appropriately focused on liberal principles of equality: To allow
a man to marry a woman but not another man constitutes gender dis-
crimination that requires the showing of a compelling state inter-
est.380 While the Hawaii Supreme Court ultimately accepted this
legalistic, liberal, right-to-equality argument, it translates poorly into
political discourse about the (in)justice of the prohibition against
same-sex marriage. As Walzer would likely remind us, that debate has
at its epicenter the meaning and role of marriage in our society. For
gay men and lesbians to convince a majority of the population that
they also deserve the opportunity to marry and to parent, there has to
be a comprehensive political discussion of the social meanings of those
terms (or goods), including their normative meanings.38' The discus-
sion cannot be limited to, or by, the traditional liberal values of neu-
trality, equality, and privacy.
Of course, the supplementing of liberal values with nonliberal
concerns, such as the value of community and the normative value of
marriage in our society, is no guarantee of political victory for gay
men and lesbians. The recent vote in Hawaii, however, provides evi-
dence that political liberalism as heretofore understood will not be
able to do it on its own.
Ultimately, the communitarian critique of liberalism proves valu-
able for gay rights supporters because it forces us to think about the
benefits and limitations of liberalism. Even if in the end we remain
379 See Hawaii, Alaska Don't Want Same-Sex Marriage, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 5, 1998, at
A17. The Hawaii Constitution now states that "[the legislature shall have the power to
reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples." HAw. CONST., art. I, § 23. After the voters ac-
ted, the Hawaii Supreme Court dismissed as moot the constitutional challenge to the pro-
hibition against same-sex marriage. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391
(Haw. Dec. 9, 1999).
380 See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63-68. 1 use the term "appropriate" because of the equal
protection implications of such an argument.
381 The recent decision by the Vermont Supreme Court requiring the legislature to
provide same-sex couples with "the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law
to married opposite-sex couples" offers us the opportunity to engage in such normative
discussions. See Baker v. Vermont, No. 98-03, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 406, at *57 (Vt. Dec. 20,
1999). The court noted in its opinion that "the essential aspect of [the plaintiffs'] claim is
simply and fundamentally for inclusion in the family of State-sanctioned human relations."
Id. at *66. The court added that "[tihe extension of the [Vermont Constitution's] Com-
mon Benefits Clause to acknowledge plaintiffs as Vermonters who seek nothing more, nor
less, than legal protection and security for their avowed commitment to an intimate and
lasting human relationship is simply, when all is said and done, a recognition of our com-
mon humanity." Id. at *67.
[Vol. 85:443
COMMUNITARANISM AND GAY RIGHTS
unconvinced that Sandel or Walzer presents a better theory of justice
than liberal theories, their criticisms help to transform and improve
liberalism. As this Article has sought to show, reading Sandel and
Walzer can teach us how to improve liberalism without having to ac-
quiesce in their ultimate suggestion to replace liberalism. In the end,
the best theoretical foundation for gay rights arises out of a deep and
rich form of liberalism that recognizes the role that communities and
shared traditions play in the creation of ajust society, but at the same
time remains deeply committed to individual autonomy and freedom.
CONCLUSION
Even though communitarians and liberals have engaged in a
lively debate for many years now, little attention has been paid to the
debate's impact on gay rights issues. While most gay rights propo-
nents have relied primary on liberal theories to formulate their argu-
ments, they should not accept those theories as a matter of course.
This Article has tested the almost instinctive reliance on liberalism by
many proponents of gay rights by addressing the communitarian cri-
tique of liberalism from a gay and lesbian perspective. That critique
proves valuable in supplementing and transforming the traditional
liberalism of thinkers such as John Rawls. Ultimately, a transformed
liberalism remains the best theory of political morality in helping gay
men and lesbians lead lives of both freedom and dignity.
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